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PARI PASSU AND A DISTRESSED SOVEREIGN'S 
RATIONAL CHOICES 
William W. Bratton* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1983, the Republic of Peru guaranteed foreign bank borrowings of 
Banco de la Nacion and Banco Popular de Peru. Some years later, Peru and 
the two banks defaulted on this and much other external debt. Some years later 
still, in 1996, most of Peru's bank lenders agreed to a composition. Under this, 
the 1983 instruments were exchanged for "Brady Bonds," with the bonds 
either stating a reduced principal amount or paying a lower rate of interest. I 
Elliott Associates, a holder of the 1983 debt, held out from the 
composition, refusing to participate. Elliott, a "vulture fund" specializing in 
obligations of distressed firms and countries,2 had purchased $20.7 million face 
amount of Peru's 1983 debt at the discounted price of $11.4 million from two 
international banks while the restructuring negotiations were ongoing.3 Elliott 
brought an action to enforce the debt at face value in the Southern District of 
New York, a focal point venue in the emerging world of sovereign debt 
enforcement. Legal recourse against defaulting sovereigns is available in the 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. This project began in conversations with Mitu 
Gulati, who bears no responsibility whatsoever for the assertions made herein. My thanks to David Carlson 
for his excellent comments. 
I Declaration of Professor Andreas F. Lowenfeld, 'Il'll I, 8, Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31,2(00) (96 Civ. 7916) [hereinafter Lowenfeld Declaration]. 
2 These hedge funds typically purchase the debt of companies and countries that are in financial distress 
and, therefore, hold debt that is trading at a deep discount. Although even the Institute of International 
Finance-the global association of financial institutions-has publicly called for a targeted legal strategy to 
counter the supposedly disruptive activities of vulture funds in the context of sovereign restructurings, these 
funds are not without their supporters. See John Dizard, A Bankrupt Solution to Sovereign Debt, FIN. TIMES, 
Jan. 18, 2002, at 24 (arguing that there is nothing problematic about a vulture fund that purchases sovereign 
debt at a deep discount and then sues to be paid in full); Vulture Hunt, FIN. TIMES, May 7, 2002, at 20 (arguing 
that vulture funds serve to provide much needed liquidity in the markets for distressed sovereign debt). From a 
supportive point of view, Elliott's enforcement action respecting Peruvian debt can be analogized to 
enforcement of the securities laws by the plaintiff's bar. 
3 Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.3d 363, 366-67 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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courts of countries like the United States and the United Kingdom,4 even as 
sovereign immunity prevents direct enforcement of sovereign obligations in 
the obligors' own courts. Elliott emerged from the Southern District with a 
judgment of $55,660,831.56.5 Unfortunately for sovereign creditors in Elliott's 
position, such judgments have value only to the extent the creditor can identify 
property of the defaulting sovereign in the jurisdiction of the judgment or 
another jurisdiction willing to levy execution. Sovereigns in default rarely 
leave valuables lying around subject to attachment in creditor-friendly 
jurisdictions. 
Elliott beat the odds and got paid. It relied on the 1983 debt contract's pari 
passu clause, which provided, "The obligations of the Guarantor hereunder do 
rank and will rank at least pari passu in priority of payment with all other 
External Indebtedness of the Guarantor, and interest thereon.,,6 Elliott took the 
clause to Brussels, the home of Euroclear, a clearing house through which 
funds from abroad enter the European banking system. Peru was about to 
dispatch a large payment on its Brady Bonds to European holders via 
Euroclear. Elliott, in an ex parte proceeding, persuaded the Belgian courts to 
block the payment on the ground that the pari passu clause gave the holders of 
the 1983 debt the right to participate pro rata in Peru's payments to other 
foreign creditors.7 Peru, not wishing to default on its Brady Bonds, paid Elliott 
in full. s Since then, vulture investors have successfully repeated the tactic,9 
with mixed results. 10 
4 The statutes that relax the traditional sovereign immunity barrier are the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act, 28 U.S.c. §§ 1330, I 332(a)(4), 1391(0, 144I(d), 1602-1611 (2000), and the State Immunities Act, 1978, 
c. 33 (Eng.), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1123 (1978). 
5 Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, No. 96 Civ. 7916 (RWS), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14169 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2000); Lowenfeld Declaration, supra note I, '15. 
6 Lowenfeld Declaration, supra note I, '119. 
7 Elliott Assocs., L.P., General Docket No. 2oo0/QRl92 (Ct. App. of Brussels, 8th Chamber, Sept. 26, 
2000). 
8 G. Mitu Gulati & Kenneth N. KIee, Sovereign Piracy, 56 Bus. LAW. 635, 636 (2001). 
9 In Belgium, for example, in Republic of Nicaragua v. LNC Investors LLC & Euroclear Bank S.A., the 
Commercial Court of Brussels once again issued an injunction, but was reversed in the Cour D' Appel de 
Bruxelles in March 2004 on the ground that Euroclear was not a proper party to the litigation. 
10 Compare Kensington Int'l Ltd. v. Republic of Congo, 2002 No. 1088 (Commercial Ct. Apr. 16,2003) 
(refusing to enjoin sovereign borrower from making payments of external indebtedness without proportional 
payment to the plaintiff), affd, 2003 WL 1935493 (C.A. May 13,2003), with Red Mountain Fin., Inc. v. 
Democratic Republic of Congo, No. CV 00-0164 R (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2001) (refusing specific performance 
of pari passu clause but enjoining sovereign borrower from making payments of external indebtedness without 
proportional payment to the plaintiff). 
A pending action in respect of Republic of Congo debt uses a pari passu clause to assert a claim of 
tortious interference with contract against a later lender who received payments. Kensington In!'1 Ltd. v. BNP 
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Elliott pulled off its Belgian caper at an inopportune time. The reading of 
the pari passu clause operative in the Belgian decision strengthens the hands of 
creditors who withhold consent from sovereign debt compositions. The greater 
the potential rewards to dissenters, the harder compositions are to conclude. 
The more unstable the composition process, the longer the duration and greater 
the intensity of sovereign distress. And in late 2000, at the time of the Belgian 
action, there loomed a sovereign debt crisis with a magnitude equaling 
emerging market (and particularly Latin American) defaults of the 1930s and 
1980s. During the 1990s, emerging market borrowers had turned to the bond 
markets to borrow hundreds of billions in dollars and other currencies. II By 
2000, market demand had fallen dramatically as fear of distress intensified. 12 
Argentina was on the brink of default, which followed in 2001. In 2004, 
Argentina's debt restructuring process remains at an early stage. 13 
Actors in the world of sovereign debt take a dim view of the Belgian 
injunction. They dismiss it as the maneuvering of a rogue creditorl4 before a 
rogue court. 15 It was, they charge, less action at law than piracy.16 The Belgian 
court, moreover, got it wrong: Sovereign debt contracts do not contemplate 
these enforcement actions. Compositions make the majority of cooperative 
bondholders better off because they help to cure distress. Accordingly, 
bondholders would be "crazy" to assent to debt contracts that held out 
Paribas S.A., No. 03602569 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. \3, 2003). But cf Nacional Financiera, S.N.C. v. Chase 
Manhattan Bank, 2003 WL 1878415 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2003) (holding that pari passu clause covering 
Mexican corporate borrower might support an injunction against its paying third party creditors but did not 
support an intercreditor action). 
II Between 1992 and 1997, credit flowed copiously into emerging markets, averaging $154 billion each 
year. William W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best Interest of Creditors, 57 
VAND. L. REv. (fortbcoming 2004). 
12 This happened after financial crises in East Asia and Russia in 1997 and 1998. Lenders may have 
underestimated the likelihood of liquidity crises and other economic distress. Alternatively, they may have 
assumed that troubled sovereigns would be bailed out by the IMF. See generally Daniel K. Tarullo, Rules, 
Discretion. and Authority in International Financial Reform, 4 J. INT'L EcON. L. 6\3 (2001). 
I3 Argentina has offered what it says is twenty-five cents on the dollar and what its creditors say is ten 
cents on the dollar (discounted to present value). The creditors, who face a coordination problem of 
unprecedented dimensions, are slowly getting themselves organized. An umbrella Global Committee of 
Argentine Bondholders was established on January 12, 2004. It represents about half of the private sector 
debt. Mary Anastasia O'Grady, Americas: Argentina Plays 'Chicken' With the IMF, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 
2004, at A13. 
14 See Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel. Jr., Inside the Black Box: How Should a Sovereign Bankruptcy 
Framework Be Structured?, 53 EMORY L.J. 763, 782 (2004). 
15 Anna Gelpem, Building a Better Seating Chan for Sovereign Restructurings, 53 EMORY L.J. 1119, 
1127 (2004) (noting that the lenders' organization has gone on record saying that rogue courts are a bigger 
danger than rogue creditors). 
16 Gulati & Klee, supra note 8, at 639. 
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encouragements to opportunistic holdouts like Elliott. 17 Meanwhile, pari passu 
clauses admit of a plausible narrow interpretation that does not extend the right 
18 
of payment asserted by the vultures. 
The contract interpretation issue soon may be joined in the Southern 
District of New York, where a class of Argentine bondholders has been 
certified in an enforcement action. 19 Argentina, fearing aggressive use of pari 
passu clauses by these plaintiffs, already has moved (without success) for an 
order precluding the plaintiffs from interfering with Argentina's payments to 
other creditors. The U.S. government has filed a Statement of Interest in 
support of Argentina's motion.20 
The government intervenes in aid of its policy pOSItion respecting the 
sovereign debt crisis. Many actors in the world of international finance, 
including the International Monetary Fund (lMF) , would like to see a 
sovereign bankruptcy regime instituted for the purpose of ameliorating 
frictions retarding restructuring negotiations.21 The U.S. Treasury opposes the 
bankruptcy initiative, even as it agrees that the frictions need amelioration. In 
the Treasury's view, the frictions stem from the terms of sovereign bond 
contracts and so should be eliminated by rewriting the contracts rather than by 
imposing an international law mandate.22 The Treasury's preference for the 
narrow reading of the pari passu clause follows from the position that a broad 
reading would add to the frictions. 
There is a gap in this discussion. No one interrogates the possibility that 
the broad reading of the pari passu clause invoked in Belgium holds out 
benefits for sovereign bondholders as a group (and not just for a handful of 
vulture investors). This Article addresses the gap, situating the clause in the 
economic context of sovereign debt relationships. The Article shows that bond 
contracts benefit bondholders in three ways when they create frictions that 
17 [d. 
18 See infra text accompanying notes 3542. 
19 H.W. Urban GMBH v. Republic of Argentina, 2003 U.s. Dist. LEXIS 23363 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 
2003). 
20 Statement of Interest of the United States, Macrotecnic Int'! Corp. v. Republic of Argentina, 2004 U.S. 
Dis!. LEXIS 2130 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13,2004). 
21 Anne Krueger, New Approaches to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: An Update on Our Thinking, 
Speech at the Sovereign Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards Conference (Apr. I, 2002), available at http:// 
www.irnf.org!extemal/np/speeches/2002l040102.htm. 
22 Under Secretary of Treasury John B. Taylor, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A U.S. Perspective, 
Speech at the Sovereign Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards Conference (Apr. 2, 2002), available at http:// 
www.iie.com/publications/papers/taylor0402.htm. 
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retard sovereign debt compositions. First, the contracts diminish the likelihood 
of default by opportunistic sovereigns seeking to externalize the effects of 
economic reverses. Second, assuming severe financial distress, they make it 
less likely that the defaulting sovereign will attempt to impose the burden of 
restructuring on the particular class of bonds. Third, assuming a restructuring, 
they improve the bondholders' bargaining position. More generally, the pari 
passu clause, read broadly, constrains the distressed sovereign's range of 
choices, enhancing the enforcement power of the bonds and arguably lowering 
the long-run cost of sovereign debt capital. 
This explanation justifies judicial attachment of the broad reading without, 
at the same time, dictating its attachment or rendering the narrow reading 
implausible or illegitimate. Accordingly, the explanation does not by virtue of 
its own existence determine the issue of contract interpretation. It instead 
highlights the difficulty of the case. No trade usage will emerge here to ease 
the burden on the interpreting court, for actors in the sovereign debt market 
dispute the clause's meaning in good faith. The court accordingly will bear 
normative responsibility for the outcome. By way of providing contextual 
guidance, this Article illuminates the source of the problem, depicting 
sovereign debt as a world of trade offs and contradictions, where a contract 
that makes the bondholders better off means one thing on the day it is executed 
and delivered, and another thing in the event of severe distress later on. With 
private debt, such contradictions are surmounted through the deus ex machina 
of a bankruptcy regime. With sovereign debt there is no bankruptcy, forcing 
the parties to paper over the tensions between ex ante and ex post by drafting 
vaguely. Intractable questions of interpretation arise in consequence. 
Part I describes the disruptive role the pari passu clause plays in sovereign 
debt compositions, stating the case favoring the narrow reading. Part II 
reconsiders the economic incentives in play at the time lenders close loans to 
sovereigns, stating a case for the broad reading. Part III works the competing 
readings through the legal framework of bond contract interpretation. The 
exercise shows that the matter comes down to a choice between an ex ante 
reading, conducted as of the time the contract is executed and delivered, and an 
ex post reading, conducted as of the later time of distress. The Article 
concludes that the ex post reading legitimately may be attached to the clause, 
not because it is correct at all times and in all contexts, but because this is in 
fact a time of distress. 
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I. UNANIMOUS ACTION, COLLECTIVE ACTION, HOLDING OUT, PRIORITY, 
AND PAYMENT 
This Part describes coordination problems and holdout incentives that 
retard the process of sovereign debt restructuring. Because the broad reading 
of the pari passu clause aggravates these problems, to describe the 
restructuring process is to state a policy justification for a narrow reading. A 
practice-based case for a narrow reading supplements the policy argument. 
A. The Policy Case for a Narrow Interpretation 
With private debt, defaults lead to enforcement against debtor property. 
Left unchecked, a sequence of uncoordinated judgments, levies, executions, 
and property sales literally tears apart a distressed producing entity. Corporate 
bankruptcy reorganization prevents this, staying creditor enforcement actions 
and providing a safe space for a composition bargain that scales down the 
creditors' payment rights and returns the debtor to fiscal health. 
Sovereign debt works differently. Sovereign immunity limits opportunities 
for direct enforcement. Default accordingly leads to informal, often lengthy 
standstills instead of destructive "grab races." The creditors wait out the 
period of distress, expecting eventual economic recovery to lead to a 
resumption of payments. Payment resumption often requires that the creditors 
come to the negotiating table to rewrite the defaulted debt contracts. Such a 
"composition," or "restructuring," scales down the sovereign's obligations. 
In theory, this causes the sovereign to recover from financial distress more 
quickly and should make both the sovereign and its creditors better off. 
Process barriers must be overcome in the conclusion of a composition. 
Some stem from information asymmetries, others from coordination problems 
due to large numbers of creditors. Still others stem from the bond contracts 
themselves. Boilerplate clauses, called "unanimous action clauses" (UACs), 
can condition amendment of the bond contract's key payment terms on 
unanimous bondholder consent. Historically, UACs govern sovereign bonds 
issued in New York. Sovereign bond contracts executed and delivered in 
London, in contrast, contain "collective action clauses" (CACs), which permit 
across-the-board amendments with a three-quarters majority. Where as CACs 
facilitate restructuring of the defaulting sovereign's debt, UACs stand in the 
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way. Corporate debt also tends to contain UACs, but bankruptcy regimes 
trump the clauses with mandatory collective action.23 
The feasibility of unanimous creditor consent to a composition depends on 
the numbers and the lending context. Historically, groups of bank creditors, 
even large ones, have proved amenable to, if not eager for, such consent. The 
numbers are small and norms of cooperation are brought to bear against the 
unruly.24 With thickly-traded, bonded debt and thousands of bondholders 
dispersed around the globe, unanimous action is impossible. At least one 
bondholder always will say no. An incentive to hold out arises from the very 
fact that the composition makes the bondholders better off as a group. The 
opportunistic bondholder withholds its essential vote in hopes of procuring a 
side payment from the transaction's proponents. 
UACs do not present an absolute bar to the restructuring of widely 
dispersed debt, however. A composition can be effected by indirection. 
Instead of being asked to vote to amend their bond contracts, the bondholders 
are asked to exchange their bonds for substitute bonds that contain modified 
terms more favorable to the debtor. The proponent neither expects nor 
requests universal participation. Even so, the closing of the exchange offer 
will be conditioned on supermajority acceptance. Holdouts remain a problem 
because a freeriding strategy remains available to a bondholder opportunist. 
Even if no side payment will be forthcoming, saying no to an exchange offer 
means holding on to the original, unamended bond. Such a hold out retains the 
benefit of the debtor's original promise to pay and all other contract rights, 
even as the exchanging majority makes concessions in respect of the timing 
and amount of payments. If only a few creditors hold out, the exchange offer 
still succeeds. But if enough creditors succumb to temptation and join the 
holdouts, the exchange offer fails. More particularly, if the subsidy to the 
holdouts is greater than the increase in value to the exchanging creditors, every 
one is better off refusing to exchange.25 The failure of the offer makes 
everybody worse off. 
Bond issuers wield a weapon against holdouts in the form of an "exit 
consent" attached to the exchange offer. Under the New York drafting 
practice, the contract's payment terms are subject to UACs, while ancillary 
23 Bratton & Gulati, supra note I 1. 
24 Lee C. Buchheit & Ralph Reisner, The Effect of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Process on Inter-
Creditor Relationships, 1988 V.ILL. L. REV. 493, 507-10. 
25 Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts. 97 YALE L.J. 232. 236 (1987). 
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protective promises and process terms are subject to CACs. An exit consent is 
a proposal to remove these protective provisions by a majority vote 
amendment under the CAC made simultaneously with an exchange offer. The 
cooperative, exchanging bondholders approve the amendment even as they 
exit. This leaves the holdouts with their original principal and interest terms 
intact but subject to manipulative action by the debtor. For example, a 
sovereign bond's negative pledge clause, which protects against the creation of 
security interests in other issues of debt, can be removed by means of exit 
consents. As drafted historically, sovereign debt contracts also leave their pari 
passu clauses vulnerable to removal by exit consent.26 As protective provisions 
disappear, the likelihood that the holdouts ever receive their unamended 
principal and interest payments diminishes.27 
Indeed, starvation by continued nonpayment is the sovereign debtor's tactic 
of last resort against holdouts-at least as long as the pari passu clause is read 
narrowly. Sovereign compositions work very differently from their corporate 
counterparts at this point in the scenario. Corporate restructuring outside of 
bankruptcy occurs on a preemptive basis, prior to default. The holdout takes a 
free ride if the exchange offer succeeds: It is "buoyed up," retaining a bond 
paying one hundred cents on the dollar even as it joins the creditors who 
exchanged for scaled-down payments in benefiting from the avoidance of 
bankruptcy and the debtor's rehabilitation. If the corporate debtor wishes to 
stay out of bankruptcy after the composition closes, it will have to stay current 
on payments to the holdout as well as to all other creditors. In the sovereign 
context the stakes ratchet up on both sides. Many sovereign restructurings 
occur after a payment default. Because composition means the exchange of 
old paper for new, it does not cure the default on the old paper. As with Elliott 
and its Peruvian debt, the holdout retains the power to both accelerate its own 
debt and claim the entire principal amount to be due presently. The holdout 
26 The standard UAC language broadly covers the bondholders' right to payment, and accordingly could 
be read to cover the pari passu clause. See, e.g., Prospectus Supplement to Prospectus, Government of 
Jamaica, 10.625% Notes Due 2017, at 62-63 (June 4, 2002). Here the contract contains a UAC including 
amendments that would "reduce any amounts payable" or change the "obligation to pay any additional 
amounts." Arguably, phrases like these refer to money due and owing under the note, rights that would not be 
affected by lifting of the pari passu clause. But the matter is not free from doubt. Drafters of exchange offers 
avoid the issue by having the exit consent modify the bond contract's sovereign immunity waiver so as to 
exclude attachment of amounts paid under the composition. See Prospectus Supplement to Prospectus, 
Republica Oriental del Uruguay, Offer to Exchange, at S-4 (Apr. 10, 2003) [hereinafter Uruguay Exchange 
Offer], available at http://www.bcu.gub.uy/autoriza/sgoioilreperfilamiento/prospectosup.pdf. 
27 On the use of exit consents to engineer a sovereign restructuring, see Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu 
Gulati, Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond Exchanges, 48 UCLA L. REV. 59 (2000). 
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thus is buoyed up much higher with respect to the restructured debt than is the 
holdout in the corporate case.28 But the sovereign debtor has an option 
unavailable to the corporate debtor: It can get away with leaving the holdout to 
starve as long as two conditions obtain. First, the holdout must have no viable 
route to enforcement of its claims, a route held out by the broad reading of the 
pari passu clause attached in Belgium. Second, the existence of unpaid 
holdout debt must not destabilize the rehabilitated sovereign's relations with 
the credit markets.29 
If pari passu clauses support actions by holders of defaulted sovereign 
bonds to block payments to other sovereign creditors, then sovereign holdouts 
occupy much the same bargaining position as their corporate counterparts. 3D If 
pari passu clauses do not prohibit payments to favored creditors by sovereigns 
in default, the potential holdout's calculations are materially altered. As long 
as the value on offer in the composition is greater than the market value of the' 
bond, even a vulture fund might find participation advantageous. Such a 
vulture, much like Elliott with its Peruvian bank debt, will have purchased its 
bonds at a deep discount in the secondary market after the onset of distress and 
28 The standard corporate trust indenture inhibits the holdout in an additional respect. Individual holders 
may bring unilateral enforcement actions only in respect of missed payments of principal and interest; they 
may not unilaterally accelerate their own bonds. See REVISED MODEL SIMPLIFIED INDENTURE §§ 6.02, 6.07 
(2000), reprinted in 55 Bus. LAW. 1115 (2000). For the suggestion that sovereign bonds should be redrafted 
to follow the corporate pattern and remove the unilateral acceleration right, see Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. 
Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?: The Role of Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY LJ. 
1047, 1076-77 (2004). 
29 This point follows from the reputation theory of sovereign debt. See infra text accompanying note 44. 
It does not follow that restructuring contracts can forbid the sovereign from making payments to holdouts. 
Such a term might open the benefited holders to an action for inducement of breach of contract. See Keith 
Clark, Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Parity of Treatment Between Equivalent Creditors in Relation to 
Comparable Debts, 20 [NT'L LAW. 857, 863 (1986); cf. First Wyo. Bank, Casper v. Mudge, 748 F.2d 713 (10th 
Cir. 1988) (holding a bank knowingly taking security in violation of a negative pledge liable for tortious 
interference). Due to this fear of tort liability, contracts in bank restructurings only go so far as to provide that 
if the debtor pays nonparticipating debt ahead of schedule, it will pay the rescheduled debt pro rata. See Philip 
R. Wood, Pari Passu Clauses-What Do They Mean?, 18 BUTfERWORTHS J. INT'L BANKING & FIN. L. 371, 
373 (2003). 
Note that the pari passu clause, under the broad reading, induces no defaults; it instead prevents 
selective compliance with other obligations assuming default on the debt the clause covers. A clause drafted 
in the negative-in which the borrower covenanted not to make any payments to other creditors-would be 
more problematic. See Clark, supra, at 863. 
3D This is assuming, of course, that the holdout can find no other assets of the sovereign against which to 
levy execution. 
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will be looking for spectacular short-term returns. 31 Without an easy route to 
payment in full, the composition itself becomes the source of the quick profit. 
The outcome of the interpretation of the pari passu clause has parallel 
implications for the debate over a sovereign bankruptcy regime. The IMF's 
proposed bankruptcy architecture would trump UACs and facilitate 
restructuring in a majority action framework. The U.S. Treasury agrees on the 
need for majority action even as it rejects bankruptcy, due to a preference for 
market solutions over regulatory intervention.32 Because UACs lie at the core 
of the process problem and UACs are contract terms, the Treasury is 
encouraging the parties to sovereign bond contracts to rewrite the terms instead 
of supporting an international mandate overriding the terms. In the Treasury's 
view, CACs are superior to UACs from an efficiency point of view, with 
UACs benefiting only opportunists who hold up rational creditors attempting 
to enhance value. It follows, says the Treasury,33 that sovereign bondholders 
will freely exchange their existing UAC bonds for CAC bonds, ameliorating 
the coordination problems. All one need do is make a public offer of the new 
CAC bonds and let the market price them. The price will at all events exceed 
that of the UAC bonds, inducing across-the-board exchanges by the tens of 
billions of face amount.34 
The Treasury's intervention has not triggered across-the-board exchange 
offers eliminating UACs from the existing sovereign debt stock, even as 
notable progress has been made in the inclusion of CACs in new financings in 
New York. Meanwhile, the Treasury's opposition stalled the IMF's 
bankruptcy initiative.35 The holdout problem remains on the table as a result. 
A policy signal for the interpreting judge results: Because the broad reading of 
pari passu magnifies incentives to hold out where the narrow reading 
diminishes them, the narrow reading should attach. Significantly, the policy 
considerations that point to the narrow interpretation also motivate both the 
IMF bankruptcy initiative and the Treasury's visionary exchange offer. 
31 John C. Coffee. Jr. & William A. Klein, Bondholder Coercion: The Problem of Constrained Choice in 
Debt Tender Offers and Recapitalizations, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1207, 1214 (1991). 
32 See Barry Eichengreen, Financial Crises and What to Do About Them, ch. I (200 I) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author); Taylor, supra note 22. 
33 See Taylor, supra note 22. 
34 Adam Lerrick & Allan H. Meltzer, Sovereign Default: The Private Sector Can Resolve Bankruptcy 
Without a Formal Coun (Carnegie Mellon, Gaillot Center for Public Policy, Quarterly Int'l Econ. Report, Apr. 
2002), available at http://emcreditors.comlpdf/n_JEC%20S0V%20Bankruptcy%20Study .pdf. 
35 Bratton & Gulati, supra note II. 
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Proponents of the broad reading are left looking like greedy speculators, 
scheming and wheedling beyond the pale of legitimate justificatory policy. 
B. The Practice Case for a Narrow Interpretation 
When a borrower is unable to pay all of its debts as they come due, at least 
one of its creditors (and likely more than one if it has many creditors) will 
receive less than the borrower's promised performance. The broad reading of 
the pari passu clause is addressed to this situation, according protection when 
one or more, but not necessarily all, creditors will be receiving less than is due 
and owing. Under the broad reading, the borrower in default undertakes to pay 
its foreign obligations pro rata to the extent it makes payments at all when in 
default. The pari passu clause, thus read, means pro rata payment to all so that 
no creditor receives a de facto preference or priority.36 
The narrow reading, in contrast, is less purposive and more textual. Return 
now to the pari passu clause in Peru's defaulted guaranty, which stated that 
"[t]he obligations of the Guarantor hereunder do rank and will rank at least 
pari passu in priority of payment with all other External Indebtedness of the 
Guarantor, and interest thereon. ,,37 Note that the clause never quite says "the 
Guarantor shall pay." Instead it makes a representation and a promise about 
"priority of payment." Much hangs on the distinction. The narrow reading's 
proponents assert that the clause intelligibly can be read to cover 
"priorities"-rights to payment as against other creditors in contract and in 
law-as opposed to the payments themselves. 
The case for the narrow reading follows from history. The proponents start 
their historical story a century and a half ago and layout a succession of 
narrow functions served by the clause in different transactional contexts. No 
additional content, they assert, should be added. 
The story has four phases. It starts with Victorian railroad bonds. The 
default rule under British law in those days created priorities in collateral under 
a common mortgage in accordance with the time of debt issue or the time of 
debt maturity.38 This first-in-time regime did not suit the purposes of bond 
issuers and holders under open-ended mortgages, who wanted all holders of all 
36 Wood, supra note 29, at 372. 
37 Lowenfeld Declaration, supra note I, '119. 
38 Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah S. Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments, 53 EMORY 
L.J. 869, 895 (2004). 
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bonds benefited by the lien to have equal rights. Accordingly, the mortgages 
provided that a foreclosing creditor acted for the benefit of all holders at the 
•• • 39 
same pnonty, pan passu. 
In the story's second phase, the pari passu clause shows up in sovereign 
bonds in the early twentieth century. Sovereign borrowers in those days often 
"earmarked" certain assets or cash flows, attaching the payment streams to 
stated debt issues without formally conceding liens. These quasi-security 
interests implied de facto priorities in the subject assets. The practical value of 
the de facto commitments was questionable, of course. Even so, other lenders 
objected to the practice. Pari passu clauses appeared in unsecured sovereign 
debt contracts to forbid earmarking, performing the same function served by 
negative pledge clauses in issues today.40 
In the story's third phase, we move forward in time to cross-border bank 
lending to corporations in the post-war era. Pari passu clauses are included in 
these contracts to ameliorate legal risks held out by national insolvency 
regimes. In cross-border lending, nothing guarantees that the borrower's 
national bankruptcy law operates, like that of the United States and the United 
Kingdom, to condition a claim's subordination on the claimant's consent.41 
The pari passu clause is thought to trump unconsented subordination by 
operation of nationallaw.42 
Now to the final phase of the story, in which the pari passu clause appears 
in contemporary sovereign bank loan and bond documentation, once again in 
39 Id. at 895-96. 
40 Id. at 896-97, 912-13; see also 2 PHILIP WOOD, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 
§ 6.03[3J (1980); William Tudor John, Sovereign Risk and Immunity Under English Law and Practice. in I 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LAW 7 1,95-96 (Robert S. Rendell ed., 2d ed. 1983). 
41 It follows on this reading that U.S. domestic corporate debt requires no pari passu clause because the 
system does not allow for involuntary subordination. Buchheit & Pam. supra note 38, at 873-74. This is right 
so far as it goes. To go a step farther. shift to the broad reading and ask why domestic corporate bonds do not 
require pari passu payments. The answer is that prior to default, payments are assumed to be unequal because 
different debt issues have different payment schedules. After default, one of two things happens. If the debtor 
goes into bankruptcy, the bankruptcy system loosely imposes equality and recaptures a limited class of 
preferential payments. See J I U.S.c. § 1129(b)(I) (2000) (containing a prohibition of discrimination in 
bankruptcy reorganization plans). If the debtor does not go into bankruptcy proceedings, a regime of creditor 
diligence prevails, and the creditors race to the courthouse under a regime of first-in-time priority. Because the 
bankruptcy alternative can be resorted to by a creditor concerned that the enforcement actions of others will 
lead to an unequal result, see id. § 303 (providing for involuntary bankruptcy petitions filed by creditors), no 
contractual pari passu provision is necessary. The system does tolerate preferential payments by debtors in 
distress prior to bankruptcy, subject to Bankruptcy Code § 547. See id. § 547; Debra J. Schnebel, Intercreditor 
and Subordination Agreements-A Practical Guide, 118 BANKING LJ. 48, 49 (2001). 
42 Buchheit & Pam, supra note 38, at 872; see also Buchheit & Reisner, supra note 24, at 497. 
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order to block involuntary subordination. The need for the block intensifies, 
given a sovereign borrower. Hypothesize a national government wishing to 
repudiate a predecessor government's debt obligations. It orchestrates a 
legislative intervention under which the inconvenient debt is subordinated by 
law to all of its other obligations. The government then claims that positive 
law prevents payment, tying its hands. The pari passu clause supposedly 
assures that a positive law payment restraint, whatever its etiology, is not a 
defense to an action on the contract.43 For a more mundane example of a 
subordination risk under national law, consider a procedure held out by the 
laws of Spain, the Philippines, and other Spanish-speaking countries. A 
creditor and a debtor can join together formally to register their debt contract, 
paying a fee. The reward is a juridical priority over other unsecured creditors. 
In the pari passu clause, the sovereign debtor promises not to participate in this 
ritual. It also warrants against the presence of a legal priority ladder applying 
to unsecured debt.44 
This four-part story neatly explains the narrow reading of pari passu. We 
see, say the proponents, why the clause is so opaque: The vague drafting 
follows from the fact that over time the clause has come to cover multiple 
problems.45 
C. Summary 
The historical story leaves open some questions: Even if all of the 
foregoing is true, what prevents the opaquely drafted clause from covering 
preferential payments as well? Does the narrow reading of necessity limit the 
clause's reach to the concerns identified-priority in law and the lapsed 
practice of earmarking of revenues-so as to require exclusion of preferential 
payments? Nothing in the historical account implies such a limit. The limit 
comes from the contemporary policy context in which the broad reading 
strengthens the hands of holdouts and discourages compositions. 
The narrow reading thus commends itself not because of the history but 
because the sovereign debt markets have stumbled into crisis. Given the crisis, 
if all other things are equal, the narrow reading should be preferred because it 
43 The ploy is not a defense to enforcement actions in the United States. See Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco 
Nacional de Costa Rica, S.A., 570 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola 
de Cartago, 566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 934 
(1985). For further discussion, see Buchheit & Pam, supra note 38, at 913-14. 
44 Buchheit & Pam, supra note 38, at 903-05; Wood, supra note 29, at 371-72. 
45 Buchheit & Pam, supra note 38, at 912. 
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makes restructuring easier to accomplish by making holding out less attractive. 
The question is whether all other things are in fact equal. Part II shows that 
they are not. It states a case for "priority of payment" to cover payments as 
well as contractual or positive law priorities even in the context of sovereign 
distress. The choice between the two readings entails a tradeoff between two 
rational but inconsistent approaches to the problem presented by distress. 
II. PARI PASSU AND SOVEREIGN CHOICES: DEFAULT AND PRIORITY 
Distressed debtors tend to be conceived as actors without choices. In this 
picture, defaults occur because resources are exhausted, not because the 
debtors act strategically; if resources are exhausted no creditor gets paid. The 
reality is more complicated. Sometimes debtors have a choice as to whether to 
default. Once in default, debtors may have resources available to pay some but 
not all of their creditors, making it possible to choose favorites. The pari 
passu clause, under the broad reading, addresses these choices toward the end 
of reducing the sovereign borrower's zone of discretion. By making 
compositions harder to conclude, the clause makes default a less attractive 
choice and hence less likely to occur. By making preferential payments 
vulnerable to challenge, the clause makes it less likely that the bonds it protects 
will bear a disproportionate share of the costs of distress. 
Section A discusses the pari passu clause's bearing on debtor incentives to 
default, applying microeconomic explanations of sovereign debt. Section B 
discusses the clause's bearing on the defaulting sovereign's choices concerning 
restructuring and priority. 
A. The Choice to Default 
The economics of sovereign debt build on the following axiom: Unless 
default imposes some cost on the debtor, not only will the debtor not pay the 
debt, the lender will not make the loan in the first place.46 Sovereign lending 
presupposes that default has a cost. The lower that cost, the smaller the 
sovereign's borrowing capacity; the greater the cost, the more willing the 
lenders are. 
46 Gabrielle Lipworth & lens Nystedt. Crisis Resolution and Private Sector Adaptation. 47 IMF STAFF 
PAPERS 188. 192. 195 (2001). available at http://www.imf.orglExternallpubslFTlstaffp/2000100-00/ln.pdf. 
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The threshold problem for the economics of sovereign debt is to identify 
the cost that satisfies the axiom. The problem admits of no easy solution 
because sovereign creditors lack conventional means of enforcement by levy 
and execution against debtor property. The exercise of working through the 
debate isolates aspects of sovereign debt relationships that make credible the 
broad reading of the pari passu clause. 
1. Reputation in the Credit Markets 
Under one school of thought, the cost of sovereign default lies in exclusion 
from future borrowing. The leading model assumes that national economies 
are cyclical and that people prefer to consume evenly across the cycles. Given 
this, it makes sense for the state to borrow on the downward cycle to fund 
consumption and later to repay the loans with returns generated on the upward 
cycle. The defaulting sovereign converts to itself a gain from trade-the 
extemporal consumption trade across the business cycle. In the model, the 
default triggers a lender embargo. The debtor ends the embargo by 
transferring the converted surplus to the lenders, its rightful owners.47 The cost 
of default to the sovereign is the cost of being shut out of the credit markets on 
the upward cycle and associated consumption constraints on the next 
downward cycle.48 Access to the credit markets being the key, this is termed 
the "reputational" model of sovereign debt. 
On first inspection, this description supports the narrow reading of the pari 
passu claus«. If a high-powered interest in credit market access determines the 
sovereign's behavior, then the sovereign will only default in the event of an 
unanticipated shortage of resources due to an external shock or other 
47 As long as the transfer is made, the credit moratorium can be a short one. See Kenneth M. KIetzer & 
Brian D. Wright, Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter, 90 AM. EcON. REv. 621 (2000). The credit inflows 
to Latin America in the early 1990s in the wake of Brady restructurings provide a good example of this. See 
Charles W. Calomiris, How to Resolve the Argentine Sovereign Debt Crisis (AEI Papers & Studies, Apr. 16, 
200 1), available at http://www.aei.org/incIudelpub_print.asp?publD= 14869. 
48 In this picture, the only state that repudiates its debt is the state that never plans to borrow again. 
Lipworth & Nystedt, supra note 47, at 189-90. More elaborate articulations of this reputational model open up 
the class of defaults to distinguish between strategic and distress situations and expand the lenders' behavior 
pattern to allow for the possibility of forgiveness. See Harold L. Cole et aI., Default, Settlement, and 
Signalling: Lending Resumption in a Reputational Model of Sovereign Debt, 36 INT'L EcON. REV. 365 (1995) 
(developing a model of how defaulting sovereigns lose access to credit markets and work to regain access); see 
also Michael R. Tomz, Sovereign Debt and International Cooperation: Reputational Reasons for Lending and 
Repayment (Oct. 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (describing how sovereign lenders who 
default can re-enter the lending markets by incurring the high-cost signal of repaying their earlier debts and 
showing themselves no longer to be "lemons"). 
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misfortune. The liquidity crises suffered by several emerging market debtors 
in the 1990s provide a good example of such severe distress: Nonresidents 
suddenly pull out their capital and resident capital responds by fleeing to other 
jurisdictions; liquidity quickly disappears and the economy is literally unable 
to meet external obligations.49 Sovereigns defaulting in such situations have no 
choice in the matter. It follows that contract terms play no role in discouraging 
these defaults. At the same time, once the liquidity crisis eases, the defaulting 
sovereign has every incentive to present a plan of composition that returns it to 
the good graces of the credit markets. This is the point in the description when 
contract terms become pertinent: If a term creates a friction that retards the 
negotiation process, it arguably fails cost-benefit inspection. Doubts arise with 
respect to both UACs and the broad reading of the pari passu clause. 
The picture changes if we modify the assumption concerning the intensity 
of the sovereign's desire to maintain its reputation in the credit markets. In this 
modified picture, the sovereign remains concerned about its reputation but can 
be influenced by competing concerns. Hypothesize that the sovereign's 
economy lapses into distress slowly. At some point the question arises as to 
whether the economy can sustain the debt load out of its own resources. A 
good faith decision as to medium- or long-term unsustainability can be made, 
even though the sovereign's foreign exchange reserves remain sufficient to 
meet near-term payments.50 In this scenario, default comes to make sense as an 
act of political will: Actors in the national government (along with their 
domestic political opponents) decide that the tax burden and administrative 
costs of continued debt service are intolerable and that the burden of payment 
(political as well as economic) outweighs the costs of default.51 
If we relax the intensity of the sovereign's desire to maintain its reputation 
one step more, a strategic default becomes possible.52 This is an opportunistic 
breach stemming from the debtor's desire to siphon off the payment flow on 
the loan for another purpose. Because debt payments reduce current income, 
49 Punan Chuham & Federico Sturzenegger, Default Episodes in the I 990s: What Have We Learned? 5 
(July 25, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.utdt.eduldepartamentos/empresarial/cif/ 
pdfs-wp/wpcif-112003.pdf. 
50 Id. 
51 Jonathan Eaton, Debt Relief and the International Enforcement of Loan Comracts, J. EeON. PERSP., 
Winter 1990, at 43, 48-49. For example, only one of the nations in default in the Latin American debt crisis of 
the I 980s, Chile, owed as much as one year's gross national product. See Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, A 
Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt, 97 J. POL. EeON. 155, 156 (1989). 
52 Lipworth & Nystedt, supra note 47, at 195. 
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default is welfare-improving as long as consequences in the credit markets 
carry little weight in the cost-benefit analysis. 
In both of these scenarios-a good-faith distress default resulting from 
political and economic calculation and a strategic default-the sovereign 
makes choices. It follows that the debt contracts can playa role in influencing 
the sovereign's choices, at least as long as the sovereign retains an interest in a 
future return to the credit markets. Pari passu clauses (under the broad 
reading), along with UACs, make the composition process more costly, adding 
to the costs of default. In so doing, they delay distress defaults and discourage 
strategic defaults.53 Because they make default less likely, they benefit the 
sovereign by increasing its debt capacity. In addition, the sovereign that 
commits to high restructuring costs at the negotiating table signals its status as 
a good credit, lowering the cost of borrowing.54 
An efficiency question arises at this point in the analysis. Costs of default 
could be too high (greater debtor welfare loss than needed for the given 
measure of creditor protection) or too low (default cost insufficient to import 
an incentive to perform). Professors Bolton and Skeel here intervene to argue 
that sovereigns have perverse incentives to commit to excessively costly 
defaults. Information asymmetry supplies one explanation for this-the 
sovereign that commits to high restructuring costs signals its confidence in its 
ability to pay. Another reason is political-a given government may borrow 
heavily to satisfy short term objectives. Contract forms that make default 
expensive expand the government's borrowing capacity and so suit the 
purposes of these short-sighted political actors. The actors, however, 
underweigh the long-run costs of the contract terms because the costs are 
incurred after their terms of office. 
The pari passu clause mayor may not be economically efficient under the 
broad reading. Bolton and Skeel's analysis suggests that it is not.55 But the 
53 Contrariwise, if a decrease in the cost of default is welfare maximizing, default is too expensive. [d. at 
199. 
54 Bolton & Skeel, supra note 14, at 771. Bolton and Skeel argue that the incentive problem would be 
corrected by a regime of first-in-time priority. Under this, the sovereign's borrowing room would shrink as the 
amount of debt increased. The cost of each successive borrowing would rise, discouraging more debt. In the 
present pari passu regime, in contrast, each borrowing ranks equally, encouraging overborrowing. The cost of 
capital is higher than it would be under the first-in-time regime because the first lender raises its rate in 
anticipation of later claim dilution. [d. at 788-90. 
55 Cf Patrick Bolton & David S. Scharfstein, Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors, 104 
J. POL. ECON. I (1996). Working with a stylized deScription of the private borrower. Bolton and Scharfstein 
hypothesize that a low-quality firm would find it optimal to maximize its liquidation value. A distress default 
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analysis simultaneously suggests that the parties to sovereign bond contracts 
have every reason to subscribe to the broad reading as a purposive matter. An 
inefficient term may nevertheless be the term intended and the inefficient 
meaning may be the meaning understood in the market. 
2. The Defecting Lender 
Return now to the reputational model of sovereign debt as originally 
described above and assume a sovereign with such an overwhelming incentive 
to maintain its reputation that it will default only involuntarily. In this 
scenario, contract terms that make default more costly impose a deadweight 
cost. But a distinction opens up at this point between a UAC and a pari passu 
clause under the broad reading, with the UAC imposing a deadweight cost and 
the pari passu clause holding out a benefit to the creditors even as it adds a 
friction. If the sovereign debtor has a high-powered incentive to regain access 
to the credit market, then the lender's primary problem lies less with the 
default itself than with the possibility of opportunistic behavior on the part of 
other lenders in the wake of default. A lender with no exposure to the 
defaulted debt could break ranks with the unpaid creditors, ignore their 
moratorium, and make a new loan to the defaulting sovereign. This new 
source of credit diminishes the sovereign's incentive to reach a composition 
with its unpaid lenders. The new lender's very appearance satisfies the 
sovereign's reputational objective. As long as such a lender is in the picture, 
even a highly motivated sovereign might find strategic default a viable option. 
Kensington International Ltd. v. Republic of Cong056 provides a real world 
example of this incentive problem. Congo incurred the debt in question in 
1984, but made no payments after 1985. Congo continued to tap credit 
markets in the industrial world through a wholly owned alter ego called 
Societe Nationale des Petrole du Congo (SNPC). SNPC procured and secured 
funds for Congo's petroleum operations in blatant violation of the negative 
pledge clause in the 1984 debt contract.57 So low is the stock of loyalty among 
lending institutions that blue-chip banks in France and Canada happily did 
being likely, it would want contracts carrying as little cost as possible in the event of default. The smaller the 
number of creditors and the lower the voting barrier, the cheaper the liquidation and the greater the value of 
the debt. /d. at 3. A high quality firm, in contrast, presents little risk of a distress default. Here, Bolton and 
Scharfstein see strategic default as the dominant problem. Factors increasing the cost of such a default-such 
as mUltiple creditors and tougher voting rules-enhance the value of the debt. [d. 
56 2002 No. 1088 (Commercial Ct. Apr. 16,2003), aff'd, 2003 WL 1935493 (C.A. May 13,2003). The 
vulture plaintiff in this case did not manage to procure an injunction. 
57 [d. at 15-26. 
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business with SNPC, even as its alter ego remained in default on earlier 
obligations. 
In the economic models, the reputational mechanism returns to working 
order if the original lenders persuade the sovereign borrower to cheat the 
interloping lender.58 With the interloper thrown into the composition process 
with the other unpaid lenders, the threat of refusal to lend once more becomes 
a cost to the borrower. In the real world, a pari passu clause, broadly 
interpreted, could provide the unpaid creditors a more effective assist. The 
defaulting sovereign can subvert the reputational system only by servicing its 
new borrowings while simultaneously remaining in default on its old 
borrowings. The broad reading prohibits this ploy, forcing the sovereign to 
make pro rata payments to both old and new lenders. For the lenders, the 
problem less concerns the meaning of the clause than, as usually is the case 
with sovereign debt, with finding a way to get the clause enforced. Elliott 
Associates' action in Belgium did just that.59 
3. Indirect Enforcement 
A second economic model of sovereign debt is built around the possibility 
of sanctions. This theory asserts that a sovereign might rationally repudiate its 
debts even when it needs a future source of finance to smooth consumption in 
downward cycles. The model depicts a sovereign at the end of an upward 
cycle. It possesses a cache of capital with which to pay the debt incurred on 
the previous downward cycle. In the model, the solvent sovereign has a 
choice. It can either pay the debt or it can default and invest the capital in an 
insurance contract designed to protect it against the next downturn. When this 
investment opportunity is available, the rational sovereign defaults because in 
the long run saving and investment have a higher return than borrowing and 
repaying. When saving and investment of the purloined capital accompany the 
default, the sovereign grows faster, increasing its consumption with every tum 
of the cycle.60 It follows that the sovereign's incentive to please the credit 
markets is unreliable and sovereign debt cannot be sustained on a basis of 
58 K1etzer & Wright, supra note 47, at 622. 
59 See supra text accompanying notes 7-9. 
60 William B. English, Understanding the Costs of Sovereign Default: American State Debts in the 
1840's, 86 AM. EeON. REv. 259, 267 (\996). If the debtor has no place in which to invest, the reputational 
concern causes it to honor the debt. See Harold L. Cole & Patrick J. Kehoe, The Role of Institutions in 
Reputation Models of Sovereign Debt, 35 J. MONETARY EeON. 45, 47 (1995). 
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reputational enforcement. The lender must have some additional recourse with 
which to inflict a financial cost on the defaulter.61 
A question arises at this point as to the viability of the lenders' real world 
enforcement arsenal. Sovereigns in default tend not to leave obvious assets in 
plain view abroad for creditor attachment. Diplomatic and military assets are 
exempt. Central bank assets tend to have stronger immunities in the United 
States and the United Kingdom than other sovereign assets.62 State-owned 
airlines are cited as an exception to the rule, and some Russian creditors 
managed to bring credible enforcement actions in the late 1990s.63 But as a 
general matter, the markets do not rely on direct enforcement. The 
enforcement theory of sovereign debt accordingly emphasizes indirect costs 
the defaulting sovereign incurs in evading its creditors. Its foreign trade must 
be conducted in roundabout ways; it loses access to short-term trade credits 
like bankers' acceptances; and when it places an asset abroad a costly dummy 
entity must be used. Proponents of the enforcement theory contend that even if 
the costs of evasion are small in relation to GNP, the costs still will loom large 
enough in comparison to the defaulted interest to make repudiation 
inconvenient; if the costs of default do not exceed five percent of total trade, 
they say, few countries show a net gain on debt repudiation.64 
The example of Congo raises doubts about the enforcement model. But 
credibility follows when the direct costs of default to the sovereign's economy 
are added to the indirect costs of evasion. Default tends to implicate a 
currency and banking crisis that disrupts the sovereign's domestic financial 
system and limits the availability of financial resources. Confidence declines, 
and with it economic performance. In the 1990s, a currency crisis implied a 
61 Bulow & Rogoff, supra note 51, at 157-58; see Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, Sovereign Debt: Is 
To Forgive To Forget?, 79 AM. EcON. REv. 43 (1989). 
62 As these assets are immune from prejudgment attachment in the United States and United Kingdom, 
the sovereign has time to shift them to a safe place before a creditor gets a chance to levy execution. Gelpem, 
supra note 15, at 1121-22. 
63 Bolton & Skeel, supra note 14, at 782. 
64 Bulow & Rogoff, supra note 51, at 158-59, 167, 174-75. The model's opponents argue that recent 
debt crises have yielded little evidence of lender interference with the trade of defaulters. Kletzer & Wright, 
supra note 47, at 622. Moreover, it is not entirely clear why the lenders would want to interfere with the trade 
of a defaulting debtor, at least given a distress default. Choking the debtor's trade only prolongs the distress 
and further delays the payment stream. Historians have found evidence to support both theses. Compare 
English, supra note 55 (arguing that defaults of American states during the 1840s support the reputational 
model), with James Conklin, The Theory of Sovereign Debt and Spain Under Philip II, 106 J. POL. EcON. 483 
(1998) (arguing that the history of the sixteenth-century relationship between the Genovese bankers and the 
Spanish crown supports the enforcement model). 
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two percent annual decline in output growth across a five-year period.65 These 
costs of crisis import a credible incentive to repay.66 
The enforcement model delivers us to the same ambiguous endpoint 
reached with the reputation model. Coordination problems stemming from 
UACs and pari passu clauses still raise a concern about postdefault transaction 
costs. If, as some assert, sovereigns as a practical matter only default under 
identifiably bad conditions67 and strategic defaults are not a practical 
possibility, it follows that the costs of default are sufficient to import incentives 
to perform. Indeed, default might cost too much. But others assert that both 
strategic default and distress default are active possibilities.68 If strategic 
defaults are possible, then the costs of default stemming from loss of 
confidence, loss of credit, and trade disruption are arguably too low. In this 
view, transaction costs stemming from UACs and pari passu clauses also are 
costs of default and so may have a beneficial deterrent effect. Finally, note 
that what is at bottom a default due to distress may nevertheless entail a 
political choice among costly courses of action. As long as the sovereign has a 
choice as to whether to default, strategy inheres in the fact pattern, and added 
default costs may satisfy the cost-benefit test.69 
B. De Facto Priorities and the Terms of the Composition 
Now assume that the sovereign has defaulted, whether involuntarily or as a 
strategic decision. A new range of choices opens up. The sovereign first 
decides which issues of debt will be restructured and which will not. Having 
made that decision, the sovereign determines the terms of the composition 
package.70 The pari passu clause, broadly read, can influence the sovereign'S 
decision in the bondholders' favor at both stages. 
65 Chuham & Sturzenegger, supra note 49, at 3. 
66 /d. at 6. An analogy to indirect bankruptcy costs in the private sector is noted. See Edward I. Altman, 
A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost Question, 39 J. FIN. 1067 (1984) (estimating indirect 
costs of bankruptcy). 
67 Herschel I. Grossman & John B. Van Huyck. Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable 
Default, Repudiation, and Reputation, 78 AM. ECON. REv. 1088, 1088 (1988). 
68 See, e.g .• Lipworth & Nystedt, supra note 46, at 193. 
69 The foregoing analysis implies a debt ceiling for each sovereign. The greater the borrowed amount, 
the greater the benefit of default and the more likely default is signaled by the borrower's cost-benefit analysis. 
The total debt load should not be permitted to approach that level. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, Debt 
with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 48 REv. ECON. STUD. 289, 289-90 (1981). 
The debt ceiling will rise, however, as the creditors' enforcement devices make default more costly for the 
debtor. 
70 Ideally, a distressed sovereign restructures prior to default. When a debtor with a current payment 
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1. Priority as Sovereign Choice 
With corporate debt, priorities follow from explicit contract terms or are 
imposed by legal regimes. A security interest or mortgage creates a priority 
for its holder; both are enforced in bankruptcy. In addition, the bankruptcy 
system accords priority in law to favored creditors, such as taxing authorities, 
new lenders, and counsel. 
Sovereign debt is different. Given barriers to enforcement, contracted-for 
security interests and subordinations have dubious value.7! The priorities that 
count are created as a matter of practice. A sovereign debtor in distress, 
although lacking cash to service all of its obligations, very well may have cash 
to service some of its obligations. Once in default, the debtor chooses which 
creditors get paid and which do not. Obligations are excluded from 
restructuring, and thereby effectively prioritized, if the sovereign deems the 
exclusion convenient to its own financial interests.72 If the creditors selected 
for nonpayment ever want to see any money, they will have to consent to 
restructuring. The practice of selection implies a powerful case for the broad 
reading of pari passu. 
To see the case, consider first the pattern of de facto priority that prevailed 
in the sovereign debt crisis of the 1980s. Bank creditors were largest in 
amount and made up the core group chosen for restructuring. Bondholders, in 
contrast, tended to be exempted.73 Restructuring of dispersed bond issues was 
widely thought not to be feasible, whether due to the existence of anonymous 
bearer paper or the presence of uncooperative, litigious holders.74 Even if 
restructuring in fact was feasible-Costa Rica closed a bondholder exchange 
offer in the late 1980s75-it was thought not to be cost effective. The 
record begins to experience liquidity problems, a composition can be tbe means to avert default. The objective 
will be to delay near-term maturities, stretching out tbe payment schedule and reducing the near-term interest 
burden. There will be a basis for trade witb the creditors if, due to tbe borrower's distressed condition, the 
debt is trading at a substantial discount on an expectation that payment in full will not be forthcoming. The 
composition relieves tbe near-term payment burden and averts tbe risk of default. Because default carries 
collateral costs for the creditors and debtor botb, avoidance of default of itself can cause tbe price of tbe bonds 
to increase. Each of Pakistan, Ecuador, and Ukraine successfully closed exchanges along tbese lines in tbe late 
1990s. In the latter two cases, tbe price of tbe bonds went up twenty to thirty percent. Lipworth & Nystedt, 
supra note 46, at 208. Argentina and Turkey followed in 2001. See Eichengreen, supra note 32, ch. 3. 
71 Bolton & Skeel, supra note 14, at 766-67 (noting tbat in 1999 Ecuador included collaterized Bradies in 
its restructuring, frustrating the market's expectation tbat tbe collateral implied a priority). 
72 Lee C. Buchheit, Of Creditors, Preferred and Otherwise, INT'L FIN. L. REv., June 1991, at 12. 
73 The rule was not absolute. Clark, supra note 29, at 861. 
74 Buchheit, supra note 72, at 12-13. 
75 Clark, supra note 73. at 861. 
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defaulting debtors of the era tended not to have issued significant amounts of 
bonded debt, and so found it convenient to exempt their bonds and maintain 
their reputations in the bond markets.76 Secured debt, new credits, debt under 
foreign exchange contracts, and debt subject to outside foreign guaranties also 
tended to be exempted,77 as of course was debt owing to the IMP and Paris 
Club members.78 The treatment accorded classes of trade creditors and short-
term lenders varied from case to case.79 As to the banks, there was no choice 
but to default. 
The practice of bondholder exclusion was exploited in the Brady 
restructurings. The banks exchanged their illiquid loans for bonds, with the 
bonds' liquidity and de facto prior status both seen as sweeteners.80 The story 
even circulated that Brady Bonds were "default-risk-free" due to mandatory 
prepayment clauses, sharing clauses, individual holder acceleration rights, and 
the like.8! This was nonsense, of course. Any corporate bondholder could 
have disabused actors in the sovereign market of the notion that payment and 
enforcement clauses assure performance; the sovereign bond market itself 
falsified the story with its histories of booms and busts.82 But financial 
optimism and the incredible stories it spawns prevailed for some years. 
The bond priority story continued to be told as the bond market replaced 
the banks as the primary source of emerging market debt capital during the 
1990s. The story's implausibility became manifest: As bonded debt stock 
grew in magnitude, its inclusion in restructuring became inevitable, whatever 
the process frictions.83 But, in the eyes of the market, falsification did not 
occur until 1999, when, in connection with Pakistan's restructuring, the Paris 
Club determined that the bondholders should be included along with other 
creditors.84 The same thing occurred soon thereafter with Ecuador and 
Ukraine. All three exchange offers closed successfully,85 even as actors in the 
76 Lee C. Buchheit, Cross-Border Lending: What's Different This Time?, 16 Nw. J.INT'L L. & Bus. 44, 
49 (1995). 
77 Clark, supra note 29, at 862-63. 78 See Gelpem, supra note 15, at 1127. 
79 Clark, supra note 29, at 863. 
80 See Buchheit, supra note 72, at 13. 
81 Chuham & Sturzenegger, supra note 49, at 20. 
82 Cf Buchheit, supra note 76, at 45-46 (describing bond market cyclicality). 
83 [d. at 48-50. 
84 Gelpem, supra note 15, at 1124-25. 
85 Lipsworth & Nystedt, supra note 46, at 206. In the latter two cases, the price of the bonds went up 
twenty to thirty percent because the markets, worried about holdouts, previously had doubted that the gain due 
to restructuring could be accessed at aiL Such dramatic increases may not occur again. Henceforth, prices of 
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bond market warned of higher borrowing costs for emerging markets due to 
the loss of the assumed priority. 86 Meanwhile, defaulting sovereigns have 
continued to make priority choices. Whereas Ecuador and Argentina defaulted 
across the board, Russia, the Ukraine, and Pakistan limited their defaults to 
selected instruments.s7 
Consider the implications of the choice between the broad and narrow 
meanings of pari passu in the bond market prior to Pakistan's 1999 
restructuring. The illusion of priority treatment still circulated, even as a 
manifest risk of inclusion in restructuring grew with the bonded debt stock. 
UACs made perfect sense in that context because they enhanced the 
probability of exclusion by adding to the frictions of restructuring. The pari 
passu clause, broadly read, did the same thing. Under it, a holdout excluded 
from the payment stream by the sovereign could accelerate its own bond and 
then use litigation to force its point. The better stocked the holdout's 
contractual arsenal, the greater the likelihood of exclusion. 
Now reconsider the narrow reading in light of the foregoing. It certainly 
makes sense for the clause to cover the contractual and juridical priorities 
identified by proponents of the narrow reading. But to restrict the clause's 
reach to this limited class denudes it of most real world value because the 
economically pertinent priorities in sovereign debt are de facto. To address 
them, the clause must cover payment itself as well as priority of payment. In 
the corporate debt context, in contrast, a bright line distinction between priority 
and payment might make sense, because legal priorities affect the status of 
classes of debt under bankruptcy reorganization plans long before any cash 
crosses the table.88 With sovereign debt, where there is no bankruptcy 
reorganization, a bright-line distinction between priority and payment makes 
little sense. Here, legally articulated priorities have no effect unless they 
impact payment; payment and priority are the same thing. 
2. The Tenns of the Composition 
Now assume that the pari passu clause has not succeeded in its primary 
purpose of contributing to a successful case for exclusion from restructuring. 
bonds of sovereigns in impending distress will reflect the possibility of successful composition prior to the 
exhaustion ofJiquidity. [d. 
86 Gelpern. supra note 15. at 1124-25. 
87 [d. at 1141. Ecuador initially excluded its Eurobonds even as it included its collaterialized Bradies. 
The market did not stand for that. [d. 
88 See II U.S.c. § I 129(b) (2000) (distinguishing between secured and unsecured debt). 
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The sovereign has defaulted and no money will be paid until an exchange offer 
has closed successfully. What role, if any, does the pari passu clause play at 
this stage of the game? Finding an answer means first addressing a 
preliminary question: Why do unpaid creditors voluntarily agree to take less 
than they were promised, instead of waiting out the distress and insisting that 
the renewed debtor make them whole in accordance with its original promises? 
For a simple scenario in which the debtor plausibly can negotiate for a 
reduction in interest rate or principal amount owing, assume an enforcement 
model of sovereign debt. Assume also that the lenders have a costly 
punishment available. Deployment of the punishment is cost-effective for the 
lenders, but the expected yield is less than the principal and interest owed. 
Given all of this, the borrower can come to the table with an offer of 
compensation exchanged for the lenders' withholding of the sanction. As long 
as the borrower offers more than the creditors' expected return from the 
sanction, they will settle for less than they were originally promised.89 Further, 
the creditors cannot credibly commit in advance to refuse to renegotiate.90 
Now switch to a reputational model. We still can posit that creditors 
rationally might make concessions, even if the sovereign remains in distress. 
The overhang of unpaid loans could discourage new public investment holding 
out a possibility of high returns. If the forgiveness of some of the debt restores 
the incentive to invest, it can be in the creditors' interest to make a concession. 
The new investment benefits the sovereign's economy, making the debt 
(valued after the concessions) worth more than it would have been worth 
without the concessions and the new investment.91 
Generalizing, the sovereign can get the creditors to approve a composition 
if the new debt it offers will have a market value greater than that of the 
defaulted debt. Restructuring is feasible if the sovereign can offer a surplus. 
For both the sovereign and the lenders, the restructuring negotiations address 
the division of the surplus. The debtor comes to the table with some 
bargaining power. Money has a time value, and the future state of the debtor's 
economy remains uncertain even to creditors possessed of full information. 
Both factors can make a deal holding out a resumption of payments highly 
89 Eaton, supra note 51, at 50-51. 
90 Conklin, supra note 51, at 493-94 (explaining Bulow's and Rogoffs model). 
91 See Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, 71 
AM. EcON. REV. 393 (1981). This has been described as the "debt Laffer Curve," because forgiving part of 
the debt dramatically increases the prospects for repayment of the remaining obligation. Kenneth Rogoff, 
Symposium on New Institutions for Developing Country Debt, J. ECON. i'ERSP., Winter 1990, at 3, 5. 
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attractive. Institutional concerns also can incline creditors toward acceptance. 
In addition, the debtor may be able to take advantage of collective action 
problems on the creditors' part, framing a low-ball offer with coercive terms. 
Exit consents, along with the threat of delisting of the old bonds, further 
enhance its position.92 
But the creditors also can wield bargaining power, particularly if they incur 
the costs of organizing themselves. Waiting has an option value, so the debtor 
cannot assume that any ()ffer holding out an increase in the price of bonds will 
gamer sufficient support. Sweeteners may have to be added. These take many 
forms: The interest rate on the restructured debt could be increased to 
compensate for a repayment deferral;93 cash payments could be offered; the 
new bonds could hold out enhanced liquidity; the terms of covenants could be 
improved; third-party guarantees could be added; or "value recovery rights" 
could be added, causing payment to be increased along with the performance 
of a macroeconomic factor. 94 Upside kickers also have been devised: With 
exchange warrants, the holders get an option to increase their participation; 
with extension warrants, holders get an option to exchange for longer-maturity 
instruments.95 
With such a restructuring negotiation in view as a possibility, reconsider 
the choice between a UAC and a CAe. A rational bondholder might well opt 
for a UAe. The question is whether the debtor will make a higher offer if all 
the bonds have UACs than if all the bonds have CACs. There is reason to 
think it will. 96 Given information asymmetries and different subjective 
profiles, the creditors will have a range of upset prices respecting acceptance of 
the debtor's offer. If the debtor needs one hundred percent or a supermajority, 
it will have to increase its offer to meet the reservation prices at the higher end 
of the creditors' range.97 The UAC thus counteracts the disorganized creditors' 
tendency to cut and run to take a lowball offer. Of course, a UAC creates a 
holdout problem even as it causes the offer to rise. But if the offer makes a 
92 Chuham & Sturzenegger, supra note 49, at 25. 
93 [d. 
94 [d. at 8-9. 
95 [d. at 8. 
96 Bolton and Scharfstein suggest that the greater the number of creditors and the higher the percentage 
of creditor votes needed to approve a renegotiation, the lower the debtor firm's surplus in the renegotiation. 
Bolton & Scharfstein, supra note 55, at 18. 
97 This is the rule of downward-sloping demand. See generally Richard A. Booth, Discounts and Other 
Mysteries o/Corporate Finance, 79 CAL. L. REv. 1055 (1991); Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really 
Premiums? Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235 (1990). 
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generous split of the surplus, holdouts will not be so numerous as to threaten 
the deal. No one ever expects one hundred percent participation in a 
composition under UACs, yet such exchange offers close all the time under 
UACs on the basis of supermajority acceptance. Ecuador recently got ninety-
seven percent participation in an offer with an eighty-five percent minimum 
participation requirement.98 Meanwhile, none of those complaining about the 
holdout problem offers evidence that holdouts regularly cause exchange offers 
to fail. 99 When offers do fail, it may be that they are too low and as a result 
attract something much less than a supermajority of creditors. 100 
The standard negative pledge clause and the pari passu clause, broadly 
read, also play a role in improving the creditors' hand at the negotiating table. 
Suppose the sovereign owes $100 and claims to have the resources to support a 
payment of only $50. The sovereign plays hardball, making a take-it-or-Ieave-
it exchange offer of a substitute debt contract with a face amount of $50. The 
creditors believe the sovereign can pay $70 and refuse to exchange. So the 
sovereign goes another round, but this time makes the new debt, still with a 
face amount of $50, senior to the debt in default. If the creditors do not have a 
pari passu clause in their old bonds, they will be forced to accept the offer (at 
least on an enforcement model of sovereign debt). The reason is that holding 
out leaves the holder with a claim for $100 against an asset base that certainly 
will be less than $50, because the new bonds get paid first. 101 Alternatively, the 
sovereign could have the new debt secured by a payment stream at its disposal, 
at least as long as the old bonds have no negative pledge clauses. The addition 
of seniority or security in the new issue imports an element of coercion-a 
powerful incentive for the creditors to cave in and take half a loaf. 102 
98 Chuham & Sturzenegger, supra note 49, at 25. 
99 Stuart C. Gilson, Transactions Costs and Capital Structure Choice: Evidence from Financially 
Distressed Firms, 52 J. FIN. 161 (1997) (showing that the holdout problem does not seem to be so severe as to 
prevent the accomplishment of restructurings respecting private debt, particularly given use of coercive 
devices like exit consents); see also Jean Helwege, How Long Do Junk Bonds Spend in Default?, 54 J. FIN. 
341 (1999). 
100 See Marcel Kahan & Bruce Tuckman, Do Bondholders Lose from Junk Bond Covenant Changes?, 66 
J. Bus. 499 (1993) (studying fifty-eight consent solicitations in which an issuer of widely held debt requested 
modification of existing covenants but did not request either interest deferral or principal forgiveness and 
showing that in forty-two percent of the cases, the issuers sweetened the terms after an initial failure to obtain 
consents). 
101 Guillermo A. Calvo, Globalization Hazard and Delayed Reform in Emerging Markets, LACEA 
Presidential Address 13 (Oct. 18, 2001), available at http://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/jernil20021 
trabaj02.pdf. 
102 The classic corporate case involving such an offer is Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 
198 (D. Del. 1943), aff'd 146 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1944). 
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Because the bonds on offer in the preceding example benefited from a 
formal priority, the creditors needed only the narrow reading of pari passu to 
upset the coercive exchange offer (provided that, like Elliott in Belgium, they 
found funds to attach or block). With a change of facts, they will need the 
broad reading. In this version, in the second round, the sovereign makes the 
same offer of $50. No priority is added to the new debt. The sovereign instead 
drafts the new debt so that continuing default on the old debt triggers no 
default on the new debt and announces its intention to make no payments on 
the old debt until the new debt is paid in full. The sovereign also announces 
that it will delist the old debt from the bond trading exchange, which threatens 
the holders with illiquidity. Does a rational bondholder tender or not? The 
new debt's priority now is de facto, but just as real. 103 
The question whether to take the stingy $50 offer ultimately goes to the 
credibility of the sovereign's threat not to pay the old debt. The threat has 
credibility to the extent, first, the sovereign can gain renewed access to the 
credit markets if the stingy exchange offer succeeds, and, second, the 
sovereign finds continuing evasion of creditor enforcement actions by the old 
bondholders cost beneficial. By tendering, the bondholder gets a bond worth 
$50. If the bondholder refuses to tender but the offer succeeds, the old debt 
loses its liquidity, and despite its face value of $100, may be worth less than 
$50. If the bondholders organize and resist, they may be able to defeat the 
offer and force the sovereign to pay more than $50. If they are disorganized, 
the individual bondholder may be better off tendering. Meanwhile, the pari 
passu clause, broadly read, diminishes the credibility of the sovereign's 
nonpayment threat by expanding the class of possible ex post enforcement 
actions. This makes it more likely that the sovereign will offer a fair division 
of the surplus in the first place. 
Of course, if the sovereign does make the fair offer of $70, an opportunistic 
holdout can wield the pari passu clause, broadly read, in an attempt to get 
$100. This disrupts the performance of the composition. But the sovereign is 
not without recourse. Under the drafting pattern common until recently, all it 
has to do is add to the offer an exit consent under which the pari passu clause 
103 We see once more that with sovereign debt the distinction between "rank" and "payment" proves 
soft; "rank" has no meaning unless it determines payments. 
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is removed from the old bonds. I04 A majority creditor vote will suffice to 
• 105 
remove It. 
C. Summary 
Imagine an emerging-market financing closing in 1992 in New York. 
Counsel for the borrower appreciates the problems bound up in UACs and pari 
passu clauses, broadly read. So counsel drafts the bond contract with a CAC 
and a pari passu clause that explicitly states that it covers only contractual and 
positive law priorities and creates no rights with respect to disproportionate 
payments made after default. The reason, counsel explains, is to reduce 
frictions in a restructuring process that must follow in the wake of an external 
shock to the borrower's economy. Unfortunately, counsel explains, such a 
process would have to include the issue of bonds then in the process of 
creation. 
The hypothetical seems incredible for two reasons. First, in 1992, it was in 
the interest of counsel's sovereign client for bond purchasers to proceed on the 
assumption that the 1980s-pattern exclusion of bonds from restructuring would 
continue to prevail. That assumption presumably impacted the rate of interest 
on the bonds in the borrower's favor. Secondly, seeking to change the 
standard form to rationalize its operation in the event of default would signal 
negative information about the borrower's creditworthiness, impacting the rate 
of interest on the bonds to the borrower's detriment. 
To insist on the narrow meaning of pari passu today, now that the external 
shock has occurred and restructuring frictions matter more than the terms of 
the financing, arguably shifts a risk from the issuer back to the bondholder-a 
risk previously priced, allocated, and paid for. 
III. PARI PASSU AND BOND CONTRACT INTERPRETATION 
Part I set out the case for the narrow reading of pari passu, and the case for 
the broad reading followed in Part II. This Part works the conflicting 
discussions through the analytical framework of bond contract interpretation. 
This analysis proceeds in four stages: first, literal meaning; second, market 
understanding; third, drafting burden; and fourth, purpose interpretation. The 
104 Alternatively, the pari passu clause can be rendered ineffective by an amendment of the waiver of 
sovereign immunity. See supra note 25. 
105 Nothing need prevent the sovereign from doing the same thing with respect to the $50 offer. 
HeinOnline -- 53 Emory L.J. 852 2004
852 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vo\. 53 
matter can be determined and concluded at any stage, cutting off further 
inquiry. 
A. Stage One: Literal Meaning 
Contract interpretation starts with the literal word. The interpreter puts 
herself in the shoes of an ordinarily reasonable person, making assumptions 
respecting the reasonable person's usages and patterns of mind. 106 This 
reasonable reader is assumed to employ standard English usage and interpret in 
accord with its generally prevailing meaning. lo7 Such objective literalism holds 
out advantages for the judicial decisionmaker: it is neutral and even-handed, 
and distances the judge from responsibility for the result. It also limits the set 
of evidentiary referents, simplifying adjudication. Objective literalism also 
holds out advantages for contract parties. Of course, the party to a complex 
contract never can know all of its literal implications; but literal interpretation 
imports stability (if not certainty) even so. The bias toward literalism applies 
with special strength in the interpretation of publicly traded debt. lOS Bond 
contract forms are inspected repeatedly by experienced business lawyers who 
expect standard English usage to apply to their work. I09 At the same time, 
literalism narrows the range of possible results, decreasing variance and 
thereby enhancing trading value. I 10 
1. The Meaning of "Pari Passu in Priority of Payment" 
How does the reasonable reader of English interpret the phrase "rank at 
least pari passu in priority of payment"? Professor Andreas Lowenfeld, in his 
declaration on behalf of Elliott in its action against Peru, argued for a literal 
interpretation as follows: 
A number of articles have suggested that pari passu clauses, though 
very common in sovereign loan agreements, do not mean what they 
say, or cannot be relied upon by lenders if they are disregarded or 
violated by borrowers .... I have no difficulty in understanding what 
the pari passu clause means: it means what it says-a given debt will 
rank equally with other debt of the borrower, whether that borrower 
106 William W. Bratton, Jr., The Interpretation of Contracts Governing Corporate Debt Relationships, 5 
CARDOZO L. REv. 371,378 (1984). 
107 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFCONTRACfS § 202(3)(a) (1981). 
lOS See, e.g., Broad Y. Rockwell In!'1 Corp., 642 F.2d 929,948·51 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 454 
U.S. 965 (1981); Harris Y. Union Elee. Co., 622 S.W.2d 239,248 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). 
109 Bratton, supra note 106, at 379. 
110 See Broad, 642 F.2d at 942-43. 
HeinOnline -- 53 Emory L.J. 853 2004
2004] PARI PASSU AND A DISTRESSED SOVEREIGN'S RATIONAL CHOICES 853 
is an individual, a company, or a sovereign state. A borrower from 
Tom, Dick, and Harry can't say "I will pay Tom and Dick in full, 
and if there is anything left over I'll pay Harry." If there is not 
enough money to go around the borrower faced with a pari passu 
provision must pay all three of them on the same basis. I I I 
There is much to be said for Professor Lowenfeld's reading. Putting to one 
side the problem of Latin translation, the stress in the standard clause appears 
to lie on the word "payment" rather than on "priority." To a reasonable 
English reader, "priority" sweeps up a range of phenomena, including 
ordering in time, and the ordering of payments in time is what the broad 
reading seeks to regulate. 
The literal words also admit the narrow reading, however. Its proponents 
move the stress to the words "rank" and "priority," arguing that the clause 
targets status in respect of payment rather than payment itself. 112 The problem 
is that the limitation, thus coaxed out of the literal words, does not make much 
sense in the abstract. This forces the proponents to follow up with an elaborate 
explanation of the salience of legal priority in the contracting context. 113 There 
results a mandarin gloss, intelligible only by reference to generations of 
practice lore. Because the matter at bottom concerns the meaning attached by 
a bondholder rather than a bond lawyer, the narrow reading, while admitted by 
the language, cannot prevail in a contest limited to the literal word. It needs 
the further evidentiary support of a showing of market understanding. 
The ensuing question is whether the broad reading, proposed as the literal 
meaning, carries such objective weight as to foreclose further reference to 
circumstance. Reference to circumstance can open the door to the conclusion 
that ambiguity forecloses a stage one literal interpretation. At this point in the 
analysis, the proponents of the narrow interpretation intervene successfully, 
making a more than adequate case identifying an ambiguity in the language. 
Once the contextual support for the narrow meaning is on the table, we see that 
the standard pari passu clause easily can be read in accordance with it, making 
a distinction between "rank in priority of payment," the status, and 
"payment," the event. This is just the sort of showing that underscores the 
shortcoming of aggressive literalism. Even as literalism holds out advantages, 
III Lowenfeld Declaration, supra note I, 'Il'IlII-I2. For Professor Lowenfeld's updated Declaration, see 
Professor Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Declaration in the Matter of Cour d' Appel de Bruxelles, R.K. 240103, La 
R€pubJique de Nicaragua contre LNC Investments LLC et Euroclear Bank, S.A.C., Jan. 27, 2004. 
112 See supra text accompanying notes 36-40. 
I I3 See supra text accompanying notes 37-42. 
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if it precludes reference to context it can make things uncertain because 
particularized and ascertainable market understandings often apply. As a 
result, a door is held open for contracts, even bond contracts, to be read in 
context. 114 
At this point, the narrow reading's proponents make a literalist counter-
attack, based on the allocation of a burden of clarity. A careful drafter wanting 
to assure attachment of the broad meaning might have added a confirmatory 
reference to the act of payment: "pari passu in priority of payment ... and will 
be paid as such." 115 A minority of pari passu clauses take this additional 
step. I 16 The very existence of more specifically drafted clauses carrying the 
broad meaning suggests a distinction between the clause's two forms. Under 
this, bond contracts are sorted between those referring only to "priority of 
payment," which would take the narrow reading, and those making a further 
reference to the act of payment, which would take the broad reading. I 17 
This ad hoc assignment of a burden of clarity does not, however, tell us the 
meaning of the clause-in-chief. A contract that adds "payment" to "priority of 
payment" does not by virtue of its own existence dictate the meaning of a 
contract that only mentions "priority of payment." All it tells us is that the 
drafter of the contract stating both phrases believes the form of the clause used 
more generally to be vaguely and inadequately drafted, something we already 
knew, and that that drafter wants to make sure the broad meaning attaches. We 
are still left trying to ascertain the meaning of the more common form of the 
clause. As to that, the phrase "priority of payment" unfortunately has no plain 
meaning that determines the choice between the broad and narrow 
interpretations. The sorting argument can win only at stage two or stage three. 
At stage two, a court applying New York law brings to bear a standard of 
market understanding, a standard that applies when publicly traded bonds are 
interpreted. I 18 To sustain the posited distinction at this stage requires an 
114 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(\) (1981). For a bond case applying the rule, see 
Buchman v. American Foam Rubber Corp., 250 F. Supp. 60, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). 
lIS Lee C. Buchheit, The Pari Passu Clause Sub Specie Aetemitatis, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Dec. 1991, at 12. 
Buchheit also offers an even more elaborately drafted clause. Id.; see also Wood, supra note 29, at 373 
(arguing that a judge should not attach the broad meaning unless words like "equal payment" or "equal 
treatment" appear in the clause). 
116 Italy's bonds provide an example: "We will pay amounts due on the debt securities equally and ratably 
with all general loan obligations of Italy." Supplement to Prospectus, US $3,000,000,000 Republic of Italy 
2.75% Notes Due 2006 (June 16,2003). 
I 17 See Buchheit & Pam, supra note 38, at 886-87; Gulati & Klee, supra note 8, at 645. 
118 Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 691 F.2d 1039, 1048-51 (2d Cir. 1982), cut. denied, 
460 U.S. 1Ol2 (\983). 
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evidentiary showing that the sovereign bond market actually distinguishes 
between contracts that do and do not expressly distinguish "priority of 
payment" and "payment." Alternatively, a burden of clarity could be imposed 
at stage three on a normative showing that the bondholders rather than the 
issuer should have made things clearer. 
2. Consistent Contracts, Counterfactuals, and Slippery Slopes 
Reasonable persons draft internally consistent documents. The tradition of 
literal interpretation accordingly rules that writings in a single transaction 
should be interpreted together and that an interpretation giving effective 
meaning to all terms of an agreement should prevail over an interpretation 
leaving a part with an unreasonable or ineffective meaning. I 19 Proponents of 
the narrow meaning contend that it leads to an internally consistent bond 
contract that operates in harmony with the wider structure of the sovereign'S 
obligations, while the broad meaning creates inconsistency and disharmony. 
a. Other Obligations 
It is argued that the broad reading makes no sense because, applied 
literally, it prohibits the sovereign from making payments that everyone agrees 
have to be made. These include payments to international financial institutions 
(IFIs) like the IMFI20 and to trade creditors who provide necessary goods and 
services-the police, the army, the hospitals, and the milkman. 121 
IFIs demand and receive de facto priority. Private creditors accept this 
because these last resort sources of credit tend to be beneficial. IMF bailout 
loans can even stave off default. 122 And it is true that the pari passu clause 
would be better drafted if it excepted these loans explicitly. But that 
observation does not tell us how the clause applies to those loans. That the 
clause does not mention IFI payments does not mean it is intended to cover 
them, even though it literally could be read to cover them. Just about the only 
thing that is clear about the clause is that it is not, and never has been, 
scrupulously drafted. It follows that there is no reason to expect or demand 
scrupulousness respecting IFIs. 
119 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 202(1)-(2), 203(a) (1981). 
120 Gulati & Klee, supra note 8, at 64 \. 
121 Id.; Wood, supra note 29, at 373. 
122 Bratton & Gulati, supra note II. 
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Coming at this point from another direction, assume that the broad meaning 
attaches. It does not follow that Elliott could use the clause to get a payment 
headed to the IMF enjoined, even in Belgium. A convention of IMF priority 
has prevailed in the market for a half century.123 Accordingly, under a market 
understanding of interpretation, the standard clause does not cover the payment 
to the IMF, and IFI payments can be excepted from the clause's reach at stage 
two. And even if there were no market understanding, it is not clear why 
Elliott would bother investing in the law suit-IFls have broad immunities,124 
so an attachment probably would not lie. 
As to the police protection in the streets and milk for the children, the 
standard clause covers only "external indebtedness." This defined term tends 
to cover only obligations in respect of money borrowed from abroad. 125 
Neither trade credit (domestic or foreign) nor domestic obligations in respect 
of borrowed money are covered. Note that even if they were covered the 
promise would be effectively unenforceable because the only venues for 
catching such payments would be the sovereign's domestic courts. Short-term 
external borrowing facilities in support of trade for essential commodities 
would be covered, but such coverage falls within the clause's essential 
purpose: A sovereign that can trade as usual has a diminished incentive to 
restart payment. Meanwhile, the milkman can be paid. 
b. CounteJfactual Possibilities 
If pari passu clauses are such good things under the broad reading, it is 
asked why corporate debt contracts omit them. If rank and payment are the 
same thing, must not Aunt Agatha refrain from paying the baker if she is 
ignoring the butcher? Why does the bar tab omit a pari passu clausei26 
The reasons are twofold. First, before default, sovereign and private debt 
are similar-no one insists on pari passu payment because different 
obligations have different timetables and everyone's obligations are being 
serviced timely. Second, after default, sovereign and private debt are radically 
different. The bar owner, Aunt Agatha's butcher, and the corporate bondholder 
are remitted to action at law against the bar customer, Aunt Agatha, and the 
123 Gelpern, supra note 15, at 1122. 
124 Id. at 1120. 
125 See, e.g., Prospectus Supplement to Prospectus, Government of Jamaica, 10.625% Notes Due 2017, at 
58·59 (June 4, 2002) (defining external indebtedness to cover funds "borrowed or raised including 
acceptances and leasing"). 
126 Buchheit & Pam, supra note 38, at 885-86. 
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corporate bond issuer, respectively. Given severe distress, the bankruptcy 
system provides a more user-friendly venue for enforcing equality and 
constraining preferential payments to favored creditors than would resort to a 
further action at law in the state courts under a pari passu clause. '27 Sovereign 
creditors do not have these expedients, so their contracts include the pari passu 
clause as a second-best (or maybe third-best) solution. 
But why, it is asked, if the broad meaning attaches, did not enforcing 
litigation occur earlier? After all, sovereign creditors have been receiving 
haircuts in painful restructuring negotiations for decades even as other classes 
of debt have been excepted, including, until recently, bonds. Because pari 
passu clauses have been ubiquitous in debt contracts throughout the period, if 
they were worth anything, someone should have gone to court to halt payments 
. . I' 128 10 VlO ahon. 
The answer to this question lies in the institutional differences between 
bank and bond-market lending. Members of bank lending groups operate 
under cooperative norms enforced by reputational and regulatory con-
straints. '29 The normative framework includes, within the group, equal 
treatment. 130 If de facto priorities allocated by the defaulting sovereign present 
a problem, group organization facilitates solution in the context of the 
restructuring negotiations themselves. As the source of funding shifted from 
the banks to the bond markets in the 1990s, observers warned that the days of 
gentlemanly cooperation were over. They predicted that with proliferating 
bondholding, litigation in the event of distress finally could be expected. 131 
The prediction proved correct. 
c. Consistency 
The proponents of the narrow reading, appealing to the rule of consistency, 
point out that syndicated loan agreements usually contain a "sharing clause" 
as well as a pari passu clause. It is argued that if the pari passu clause is 
broadly read, these contracts cover the same function twice. If that is true, they 
argue, the broad meaning makes no sense, because the sharing clause is 
127 See supra note 39. 
128 Buchheit & Pam, supra note 38, at 884. 
129 Buchheit, supra note 76. at 53-54. 
130 See Buchheit & Reisner. supra note 24. at 504-05. 
131 Buchheit. supra note 76. at 54. 
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exhaustively negotiated and drafted, although the pari passu clause is complete 
• 132 
10 a sentence. 
A number of responses can be made. First, belt-and-suspenders drafting is 
not unusual in financial contracting. Second, the question of interpretation 
arises in connection with bond contracts, not syndicated loan agreements. 
Given the long, chameleon-like history of the pari passu clause, there is every 
reason to suppose it might take on a different meaning in respect of a bond in 
1995 than it had in respect of a 1975 bank credit facility, if only because in the 
case of the bond de facto priority was entertained as an active possibility. 
Third, the two clauses perform different functions. Sharing applies to the 
lenders, constraining potential enforcement actions by individual banks for the 
benefit of the other members of the lending group. The pari passu clause 
covers the borrower's voluntary payment activity rather than the lenders' 
enforcement activity, which by hypothesis puts the borrower in an involuntary 
posture. The pari passu clause also reaches outside of a given issue's group of 
holders to cover payments to all foreign private lenders. It also should be 
noted that bond contracts differ from bank loan agreements in not traditionally 
imposing sharing duties in respect of unilateral enforcement activity.133 With 
bonds, the private law norm of reward to the diligent creditor prevails. 134 Thus 
sovereign bond contracts permit a holder to accelerate its own bonds 
unilaterallyl35 and private bond contracts permit a holder to sue individually for 
missed payments.136 There does not appear to be any inconsistency. 
d. The Slippery Slope 
It is suggested that the broad reading makes the pari passu clause a 
dangerous instrument-that it implies that all postdefault payments must be 
pro rata across all creditors, whether benefited by the clause or not, and that it 
132 Buchheit & Pam, supra note 38, at 884; see also Gulati & KIee, supra note 8, at 646, Gulati and KIee 
also argue that the broad reading renders the negative pledge and acceleration clauses superfluous. I do not 
understand these connections. As to mandatory payment clauses and turnover clauses, see supra note 29. 
133 When the official sector suggested sharing clauses in sovereign bonds in 1998, the investor community 
rejected it. Buchheit & Pam, supra note 38, at 884-85. 
134 1 THOMAS D. CRANDALL ET AL., THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS §§ 6.18, 6.41 (2002) 
(describing first-in-time priority to enforcing creditors); 2 id. § 16.10 (noting that outside of the delimited 
bankruptcy recapture provision, preferential payments are not fraudulent conveyances and are not voidable). 
135 See supra note 28. 
136 Action by an indenture trustee of a private issue, in contrast, proceeds for the benefit of the group and 
is subject to a different set of rules. See REVISED MODEL SIMPLIFIED INDENTURE §§ 6.07, 6.08 (2000) 
(providing that holder can sue on its own bonds but that amounts collected by trustee be paid pro rata), 
reprinted in 55 Bus. LAW. 1115 (2000). 
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further implies a lack of finality with respect to any non-pro rata payment 
received. A nonrecipient will have an action against the recipient of any non-
137 pro rata payment. 
These are interesting but implausible interpretive speculations. The broad 
reading supports the bondholder interest because it forces the sovereign either 
to leave the bonds out of the restructuring or bring in all classes of debt 
similarly situated, and because as long as default continues, it requires that any 
payment made on foreign debt be made pro rata with respect to the debt 
covered by the clause. At no point does the benefited bondholder make a 
promise to reject or share a proffered payment not made pro rata; at no point 
do any other claimants make or receive promises respecting payments. It 
follows that no third party rights are created. It is difficult to imagine that a 
court would make these extensions, even as it goes without saying that vultures 
looking for deep pockets will assert third-party claims. 138 
The foregoing should not be taken to assert that pari passu clauses, broadly 
read, do not trigger difficult issues of application. They do, with the primary 
questions concerning particular applications of a pari passu payment concept. 
Assume that an exchange offer has closed, but that a holdout has procured a 
judgment for principal plus accrued interest. The issuer now is ready to make 
the first interest payment on the new bonds. What is pari passu treatment of 
the holdout who no longer holds a bond but a judgment? Does the payment of 
seven cents on the dollar on the new bonds mean the judgment creditor gets 
paid one hundred cents on the dollar of its judgment? The clause itself 
provides no answer. 
B. Stage Two: Market Understanding 
Proponents of the narrow interpretation contend that their reading has such 
currency in sovereign debt markets as to conclude the matter under the 
standard of market understanding. The narrow reading, they assert, embodies 
"the market's collective memory of where [the clauses] originated and what 
they were designed to achieve." 139 It is the "settled understanding" of 
137 Buchheit & Pam, supra note 38, at 885-86. 
138 See Nacional Financiera, S.N.C. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 2003 WL 1878415 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 
2003) (holding that holder of debt covered by pari passu clause has no action against unrelated creditor 
receiving a payment in violation). 
139 Buchheit & Pam, supra note 38, at 918. 
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practitioners in international debt markets,14O a meaning "accepted by general 
consensus among market participants." 141 
The discussion in Part II, with its explanation of the broad meaning's 
economic functions, goes some distance in refuting this assertion because it 
considers the interest of the bondholder rather than the memory of the bond 
lawyer. Any remaining distance can be covered by a review of the legal 
commentary. At least one commentator clearly accepts the broad reading. 142 
The broad reading also at least appears to be within the contemplation of a 
leading treatise writer. 143 Other discussants,l44 including the Emerging Market 
Creditors Association (EMCA)/45 recognize the existence of an active 
interpretive dispute and acknowledge that many lawyers, bankers, and 
bondholders subscribe to the broad reading. 146 No less an authority than Lee 
Buchheit, advancing the narrow meaning as one for which a "good case" can 
be made/47 has acknowledged that opinions differ on the clause's meaning: 
One sometimes encounters an inquisitive borrower who asks why 
this little breeze off the Tiber has ruffled through the pages of his 
loan agreement. This is when the fun starts. "It means you can't pay 
back somebody else's loan if you're not then current on your 
payments under this loan," is how some bankers may explain it. "It 
means you can't give a preference to some other creditor that you are 
not at the same time giving to us," will be the interpretation offered 
by others .... 
140 Wood, supra note 29, at 372. 
141 Buchheit & Pam, supra note 38, at 889. 
142 Brian W. Semkow, Syndicating and Rescheduling International Financial Transactions: A Survey of 
the Legal Issues Encountered by Commercial Banks, 18 INT'LLAW. 869, 899 (1984). 
143 Tudor John, supra note 40, at 96 ("[The clause] is intended to prevent the earmarking of revenues of 
the government towards a single creditor; the allocation of foreign currency reserves, and generally against 
legal measures which have the effect of preferring one set of creditors against the others or which discriminate 
between creditors."). The passage can be read either way. The mention of "allocation of foreign currency 
reserves" as a practice apparently separate from "earmarking" connotes a preferential payment. /d. 
144 Reference also can be made to Alliance Bond Fund, Inc. v. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A., 143 
F.3d 688 (2d Cir. 1998), rev'd, 527 U.S. 308 (1999). This case was litigated from the Southern District of 
New York through the Second Circuit to the Supreme Court and back on a preliminary remedies question. 
The right asserted was to payment under a pari passu clause. Although the issue of interpretation was not 
litigated, the parties in interest appear to have assumed that the broad reading attached. 
145 Letter from Abigail McKenna on behalf of Board of Directors of EMCA, to Judge Thomas P. Griesa 
(Jan. 14, 2004) (on file with author) (stating that "there are conflicting views among leading market 
participants regarding the correct interpretation of the pari passu clause"). 
146 Buchheit, supra note 72, at II, 12; Gulati & Klee, supra note 8, at 645. 
147 Buchheit, supra note 72, at 12. 
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[T]he lender is not being told anything about where it will stand 
in a queue of bankruptcy creditors. In the absence of this explanation 
... a goodly number of bankers (and more than a few sovereign 
borrowers) seem to believe that the pari passu covenant is there to 
compel the borrower to pay all of its external debt on a ratable basis 
(either in terms of the amount, or the timing, of debt service 148 payments) .... 
Finally, we tum to the trenches, where standard bond contract language has 
been redrafted in the past year or so. Actors working under 0-7 auspices have 
devised new CACs adequate to the task assigned by the Treasury.149 Infonnal 
pressures have resulted in the insertion of these clauses in New York 
borrowings by Mexico, Brazil, Uruguay, South Africa, and many other 
countries. ISO The new CACs tend to pennit amendment of payment tenns on 
approval of seventy-five percent of the bondholders. 151 The new fonns also tie 
amendment or removal of their pari passu clauses to the seventy-five percent 
supennajority figure. ls2 Under earlier standard forms, pari passu clauses were 
not mentioned specifically in the UAC and arguably were subject to 
amendment or removal by a bondholder majority.IS3 Majority amendment 
makes the clauses more vulnerable to removal by exit consent. The inclusion 
of the pari passu clause in the territory covered by the new CAC supennajority 
provision looks like a giveback: Even as the UAC is abandoned, the pari passu 
clause gets more protection from removal in an exchange offer, being elevated 
to equal dignity with the bond's payment tenns. If the drafters of the new 
CAC attached the narrow meaning of pari passu, this innovation would not 
make sense. Under the narrow meaning, the pari passu clause is only a 
boilerplate technicality-a covenant covering a residual class of borrower 
actions unlikely ever to implicate the value of the bonds. One would neither 
expect such a provision to be singled out for removal by exit consent nor to be 
protected by a supennajority amendment provision. The change in the 
contracting pattern signals strongly that contemporary drafters either attach the 
148 [d. at II, 12. 
149 See Bratton & Gulati, supra note II. 
150 John Barham, Cooking Up a New Solution, LATINFIN., June 2003, at 10. The list also includes Canada, 
Turkey, Belize, Guatemala, Panama, Venezuela, and Korea. One exception to the trend is Israel, which used 
UACs in its New York law registration. For a recent report on this front, see INT'L MONETARY FUND, 
PROGRESS REPORT TO THE INT'L MONETARY AND FIN. COMM. ON CRISIS RESOLUTION (2003), available at 
http://www.imf.org/extemaIlnp/pdr/cr/2003/eng/090503.pdf. 
151 See Uruguay Exchange Offer, supra note 26, at 39. 
152 [d. 
153 The matter is not free from doubt. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
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broad meaning or deem likely its attachment by a court applying a standard of 
market understanding. 
What the market understands, then, is that informed observers disagree 
about the clause's meaning and that the dispute must be resolved in court. 
Lawyerly precedents and practices do not of themselves dictate a case for the 
narrow meaning. 
C. Stage Three: Drafting Burden 
Should not the proponent of the broad meaning bear a burden of clarity? 
Or, alternatively, perhaps the borrower should bear the burden of clarity on the 
ground that the narrow meaning is counterintuitive. Courts often decide 
between disputed interpretations by assigning such a drafting burden. Once 
the burden is imposed, the case is decided against the party bearing the burden. 
This is an easy route to a decision and so is attractive to the court. 
Where, in a case such as this, inquiry yields two plausible competing 
interpretations, contract law, as a last resort,154 allows the invocation of the 
canon of interpretation contra pro!erentem, or interpretation against the 
drafter. 155 As counsel for the underwriters customarily drafts the bond 
contract,156 this implies a burden on the bondholders, the underwriters being the 
bondholders' predecessors in interest. Unfortunately, this approach lacks a 
basis in reality in this case. With old standard language like this, there is no 
drafter against which to construe. 
If we were to go ahead anyway and allocate a drafting burden here, we 
would do so on the ground that a given party's drafter should have clarified the 
clause. But, as between the two parties to the sovereign debt contract, no 
persuasive distinction can be drawn that allocates this responsibility, whether 
based on culpability or capability. A question arises: Why, given this 
background of controversy, would expensive lawyers put such a vague clause 
in their contracts when a simple sentence would clarify matters? In fact, 
sometimes getting the deal closed is both sides' highest priority. Vaguely 
drafted clauses hold open a matter in dispute and avoid a negotiation standoff 
that could disrupt the transaction's accomplishment. 157 As we have seen, a 
154 3 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN. CORBIN ON CONTRACfS § 559 (1951). 
155 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFCONTRACfS § 206 (1981). 
156 See Stephen Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical Examination 
of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929, 990 (2004). 
157 This is not uncommon in financial contracting. See Bratton, supra note 106, at 384-85. 
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borrower's lawyer who insisted on a pari passu clause unambiguously 
expressing the narrow meaning could disrupt lender expectations respecting 
exclusion from restructuring and also could have been seen to signal hidden 
information about pending distress. 158 A ·lender's lawyer seeking a clause 
unambiguously expressing the broad reading could disrupt things too, given 
the existence of a literature advocating the narrow reading and the tradition of 
sovereign discretion respecting payment priorities. With a drafting tradition 
going back decades and a market satisfied by a vaguely drafted clause, 
incentives lie with leaving well enough alone. The drafting lawyers and their 
clients consciously left the open question as to the meaning of pari passu to a 
reviewing judge. 
The law and economics notion of a penalty default does not prove helpful 
either. Like the common law canon of interpretation against the drafter, the 
penalty default applies when one party to the contract has superior information 
and an incentive not to disclose it. 159 The penalty default puts the burden of 
clarity on the party with the information advantage, prodding it to disclose. To 
import this notion into the sovereign debt context puts the burden on the 
borrower, for in a sovereign bond negotiation the borrower has superior 
information about its own financial health and intentions respecting priorities 
in the event of distress. But this is a crude route to an endorsement of the 
broad meaning. A more sustained interrogation of the economic context is 
needed. 
Either proponent could have done a better job of drafting here. But neither 
has greater fault. As between the two proponents and their respective clients, 
there is no pertinent distinction that justifies allocation of an outcome-
determinative drafting burden. 
D. Stage Four: Conflicting Purposes and Comparative Expectations 
Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bankl(IJ famously established a 
standard of market understanding in bond contract interpretation. The market 
understanding is to be applied as a matter of law, thus bypassing the jury as 
well as subjective particulars concerning the contracting parties and their 
158 See supra Part II.C. 
159 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner. Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default 
Rules, 99 YALEL.J. 87,127-30 (1989). 
160 691 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.), cen. denied, 460 U.S. 1012 (1983), 
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intentions. 161 It tends to be forgotten, however, that the parties in Sharon Steel 
proved no market understanding sufficient to decide the case. The court 
instead balanced the interests at stake using a norm of least injury under 
uncertainty as to meaning: 
Where contractual language seems designed to protect the interests of 
both parties and where conflicting interpretations are argued, the 
contract should be construed to sacrifice the principal interests of 
each party as little as possible. An interpretation which sacrifices a 
major interest of one of the parties while furthering only a marginal 
interest of the other should be rejected in favor of an interpretation 
which sacrifices mar?,inal interests of both parties in order to protect 
their major concerns. 62 
A similar approach will be required in the interpretation of the pari passu 
clause. As in Sharon Steel, the vagueness of the clause's language combines 
with the noisiness of the background signals from the market to put the onus 
on the judge. The case must be decided by reference to the purposes of the 
contract language, the expectations of the parties, and the values at stake. 
Sharon Steel's norm of least injury is backward-looking-it focuses on 
existing contracts and the allocation of sunk costs among the parties to those 
contracts, without asking questions about future effects and incentives. 
Efficiency considerations usually dictate a forward-looking approach. Is 
Sharon Steel's norm by implication inefficient? No, because bond contract 
interpretation is a subject matter that tends to implicate only wealth allocation 
respecting past transactions. The future presents less reason for concern than 
usual in this context because the next generation of contracts always can be 
rewritten. Once a definitive New York law opinion has been rendered 
respecting pari passu, the interpretation it attaches becomes the focal point for 
the market's understanding. New bonds will be priced to reflect the attendant 
risks. If the market decides that the judicial reading does not suit its purposes, 
the drafters of future contracts can reverse the result by redrafting so as to 
reflect whatever meaning they wish to attach. Of course, path dependencies or 
other frictions could retard such an adjustment. 163 But that worry does not 
seem cognizable here, given recent market movement toward CACs after a 
161 See id. at 1048-51. 
162 Id. at 1051. 
163 For the view that network effects can retard the responsiveness of standard bond contract forms, see 
Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or "The 
Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REv. 713 (1997). 
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century's use of UACs. l64 Accordingly, absent a showing that one reading is 
clearly superior to the other reading in respect to the future of the sovereign 
bond market, the judge safely can dispense with prospective implications and 
concentrate on the parties to the transaction in question and all similar past 
transactions. 
As to existing contracts, the outcome will follow from the temporal 
perspective chosen, ex ante or ex post. An ex ante perspective favors the broad 
reading. Here the purposes of the parties are fixed as of the time of 
contracting, by hypothesis during the optimistic days of the early 1990s. At 
that time, as we have seen, the 1980s restructuring pattern still signaled de 
facto priority treatment for bonds. Issuers took advantage of this impression 
and pari passu clauses figured into the illusion of priority. The contract price 
presumably reflected that expectation. 
An ex post point of view situates expectations at the time of default, and, at 
least in the case of Argentina, recognizes the fact that restructuring implies 
daunting process barriers. The balance of interests arguably tips to the narrow 
interpretation. The primary original purpose-the assurance of the 
continuance of the 1980s practice of excluding bonds from restructuring-has 
failed. There is simply too much bonded debt to allow its effectuation. That 
being the case, the bondholders' best interests lie in a smooth restructuring 
process. After all, a composition only succeeds if the debtor holds out a 
surplus (assuming the bondholders manage to organize). The broad reading 
makes possible after-the-fact disruption of the composition and, thus, interferes 
with the bondholder majority's pursuit of the surplus. Now, it is true that the 
broad reading also assists the bondholders as they bargain for the largest 
possible share of the surplus. But the bondholders are not without contractual 
assistance here, for all 1990s sovereign bond contracts issued in New York 
contain UACs. 
The proponent of the broad reading is not without an argument at this 
stage: The threat of disruption may be overblown. Pakistan, Ecuador, and 
Ukraine show that sovereign debt restructurings can work in this bondholder 
era. 165 Holdouts have not been a problem. Credible exchange offers have to 
put value on the table. Bondholders, including vultures, have tended to grab 
the value and have avoided costly enforcement actions. Furthermore, pari 
passu clauses are vulnerable to removal by exit consent. The vulture problem 
164 See Choi & Gulati, supra note 156 (describing these developments in detail). 
165 See Chuham & Sturzenegger, supra note 49, at 26-27. 
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seems to concern not debt issues in recent compositions but old paper-either 
defaulted issues as to which no composition ever was attempted or Issues 
subjected to restructuring prior to use of the exit consent device. 
At no point in this analysis does the narrow reading attach because 
"priority of payment" means only legal priorities. The narrow reading 
commends itself on the assumption that it assists a bondholder majority in 
accessing a payment stream that is value-maximizing in the restructuring 
context. Payments are the only things that really count with sovereign debt. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Under this Article's interpretation of pari passu, a court legitimately can 
attach the narrow meaning, but only to the extent that it has been persuaded 
that process frictions pose an unduly costly barrier to sovereign debt 
restructuring and so attaches the narrow meaning as a means to the end of cost 
reduction. 
An oddity in this interpretive approach must be admitted. It implies that 
pari passu meant one thing (broad reading) in a new issue of Argentine bonds 
in 1994 and another thing (narrow reading) in the same bonds in 2004, given 
default. It also implies that pari passu might revert to the broad meaning in a 
new sovereign issue containing a CAC that sweeps the pari passu clause into 
the supermajority amendment regime-as we have seen, this drafting 
development signals a preference for the broad reading. Although the meaning 
of the pari passu clause does have chameleon-like properties, this seems to go 
too far. 
Interpretation that is dynamic over time makes perfect sense in this context. 
To see why, compare private debt contracting once again. With private debt, 
distress means bankruptcy, and one purpose of bankruptcy is to put most of the 
carefully drafted terms in the debtor's bond contracts into the paper shredder. 
Although the contracts are drafted with a view to debtor distress and are 
designed to protect the creditor's enforcement interest in the event of distress, 
they turn out to be value-destructive to both the debtor and the creditor when 
severe distress actually occurs. The result is a value-conserving intervention 
by the state in the form of a contract-avoiding bankruptcy regime. Economists 
are only beginning to articulate theories that explain the contradiction between 
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the ex ante rational form of the debt contract and the same contract's ex post 
d f . 166 ys unctIOn. 
The point for present purposes is clear enough: The shift to the ex post in 
the interpretation of the pari passu clause follows from the fundamentals of the 
debtor creditor relationship. Where normally an ex ante timeframe should 
guide contract interpretation, so as to protect values freely allocated by the 
contracting parties from opportunistic ex post recapture, temporal perspectives 
work differently with debt, distress, and composition. Recognition of the 
tension between the ex ante and ex post creditor interest also helps explain why 
bond lawyers have for decades perpetuated a badly drafted clause. The 
problem continues with the new CACs. If a definitive judicial ruling attaches 
the narrow meaning, today's drafters face the problem of redrafting the pari 
passu clauses in the new CACs so as to make it clear that the broad meaning is 
intended. If they do that, however, they tie their own bondholders' hands in 
the event that severe distress makes composition a favored outcome and 
holdout disruption too costly. 
The solution lies in a sovereign bankruptcy regime. The same economics 
that cause the pari passu clause to raise an intractable issue of contract 
interpretation demonstrate the bankruptcy of the U.S. Treasury's contractarian 
approach. There is no perfect debt contract that is efficient in bad times as 
well as in good. 
166 See Ernst·Ludwig von Thadden et aI., Optimal Debt Design and the Role of Bankruptcy (Nov. \9, 
2003) (unpublished manuscript). at http://papers.ssm.com!so13/papers.cfm?abstracUd=44051. 
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